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Authorship, Ownership, and Control:
Balancing the Economic and Artistic
Issues Raised by the Martha Graham
Copyright Case
Sharon Connelly*
We have all walked the high wire of circumstance at times.
We recognize the gravity pull . . . as [the acrobat] does.
The smile is there because he is practicing living at that
instant of danger. He does not choose to fall.
Martha Graham (1894–1991)1
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1
MARTHA GRAHAM, BLOOD MEMORY 5 (1991). Graham’s dance technique, by
contrast, contains a series of falls, because “‘[w]hen one physically rises from the ground,
it empowers the possibility of beginning again.’” Jennifer Dunning, Still Paying Heed to
Graham’s Cry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, § 2, at 18 (quoting Pearl Lang, choreographer
and former lead performer in the Martha Graham Dance Company).

837

CONNELLY

838

4/30/2005 2:05 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 15:837

C.

Artist-Driven Organizations within the Nonprofit
Rubric........................................................................... 848
D. Copyright Protection and the Field of Dance ............. 852
1. Historic Overview ................................................ 852
2. The Essence of “Owning” a Dance...................... 856
3. Presumption of Ownership within the Field ........ 858
E. Overview of the Martha Graham Copyright Case....... 859
II. LEGALITIES OF CONTROL: WORKS FOR HIRE,
NONPROFITS, AND MORAL RIGHTS....................................... 863
A. The Right to Control and the Work-for-Hire
Doctrine ....................................................................... 863
1. Works for Hire under the 1909 Act ..................... 865
a) The “Instance and Expense” Test................... 865
b) The “Instance and Expense” Test as
Applied to Graham’s Works (1956–1977)..... 866
i. District Court............................................ 866
ii. Second Circuit .......................................... 866
2. Works for Hire under the 1976 Act ..................... 869
a) “Employee” Status under the Common
Law of Agency ............................................... 869
b) Agency Factors as Applied to Graham’s
Works (1978–1991)........................................ 870
i. District Court............................................ 870
ii. Second Circuit .......................................... 872
B. The Significance of Control within Nonprofit
Organizations .............................................................. 872
1. Fiduciary Duty ..................................................... 873
2. Private Inurement ................................................. 875
C. Artistic Control and Moral Rights............................... 876
1. Moral Rights Defined........................................... 877
2. Limited U.S. Recognition of Moral Rights.......... 879
III. REALITIES: THE CONTROL CONUNDRUM.............................. 881
A. Nonprofit Organizations Promote Artists’
Economic and Artistic Interests................................... 882
B. Artists’ Rights as Distinct from Successors’ Rights .... 885
C. Artistic Control and the “Moral” Aspects of
Economic Rights .......................................................... 886
D. Contracting for Control ............................................... 889

4/30/2005 2:05 PM

CONNELLY

2005]

THE MARTHA GRAHAM COPYRIGHT CASE

839

CONCLUSION................................................................................ 890

INTRODUCTION
By upholding a district court ruling that has been condemned
as a dangerous precedent by many in the dance community,2 the
Second Circuit has affirmed that Martha Graham’s nonprofit
creation, the Martha Graham Center for Contemporary Dance
(“Center”), owns the rights to the bulk of her work.3 The ruling is
an affront to the accepted tenets of the dance world, where there
has “always been the assumption . . . that the choreographer owns
his or her own work and can leave that work to whomever he or
she would like to.”4 Even more unsettling to many in the field was
the determination by the court that the Center was the “statutory
‘author’”—for purposes of copyright—of works created while
Graham was Artistic Director of the Center.5
2
See Brief of Amici Curiae American Dance Festival, Inc. et al. at 2, 11, Martha
Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc.,
380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)) (This brief was filed on behalf of the
American Dance Festival; Gerald Arpino, co-founder and Artistic Director of the Joffrey
Ballet of Chicago; and Gordon Davidson, Artistic Director of the Center Theatre
Group/Mark Taper Forum of the Los Angles County Music Center). The Amici Curiae
warned that the district court’s decision would have “far-reaching implications in the art
world” and “turn[ed] the rationale of the work-for-hire doctrine on its head.” Id. at 2.
3
Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 647 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3570
(U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277) [hereinafter Graham IV] (This case was argued
before Circuit Judges Newman, Kearse, and Pooler on January 29, 2004. It was decided
on August 18, 2004.); see also Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha
Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 612–13 (S.D.N.Y.
2002), aff’d in part, 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Graham III].
4
Jennifer Dunning, Dance and Profit: Who Gets It?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2003, at
B9 [hereinafter Dunning, Dance and Profit] (quoting Charles Reinhart, Director of the
American Dance Festival). “The whole structure of the Martha Graham Dance Company
and its legal entities was to support Martha, not the other way around.” Id.; see also
Jennifer Dunning, Hearings Start in Suit over Graham Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
2001, at E8 [hereinafter Dunning, Hearings Start] (“[L]eading and innovative
choreographers like Graham, George Balanchine, Merce Cunningham and Paul Taylor
have long been assumed to own their work rather than to be employees hired by the
institutions they worked with and created.”).
5
Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 634, 641–42 (holding that the Center, as Graham’s
employer, was the legal “author,” whereas Graham, as the creator of the work, was the
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Ronald Protas, Graham’s legatee and her successor as Artistic
Director, claimed the rights to her work and instigated the suit
against the nonprofit Center which had supported and maintained
Graham’s choreography since 1948.6 At issue in this case were the
copyrights to seventy choreographic works created by Martha
Graham between the early 1920s and her death in 1991.7 The main
issue on appeal was whether the work-for-hire doctrine applied to
works choreographed by the primary artistic employee of a
nonprofit corporation that was “created to serve the creative
endeavors of an artistic genius.”8 The Second Circuit upheld the
application of the work-for-hire doctrine to works created after
1966 while Graham was a full-time employee of the Center, during
which time her contractual duties as Artistic Director included
choreography.9
While the primary question considered in the case was whether
Graham actually owned the rights to her work at the time of her
death, the overriding issue seemed to be whether her beneficiary
should be allowed to remove those works from the nonprofit dance
company she had founded. Consequently, the court’s decision
may have been influenced by the fundamental equitable
consideration of who deserves to own these works. A finding in
favor of the Center, which had served as incubator and home to the
work for more than fifty years, would likely insure continued life
for the works through performance and preservation. In contrast, a
finding in favor of Protas, who had refused to allow the Martha
Graham Dance Company to perform any of Graham’s works after
his removal as Artistic Director of the Center, would possibly
leave no single living repository for the work and might place the
“author” in the colloquial sense); see also Dunning, Dance & Profit, supra note 4 (“It has
been hard for some in dance to reconcile the image of Graham as a pioneering artist in
American modern dance, an art known for its unruly independence, with the idea of a
choreographer as a negotiating employee . . . .”); infra notes 138–40 and accompanying
text.
6
See discussion infra Parts I.A–B.
7
Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 570. Although Graham choreographed 180 works
during her lifetime, only seventy are “fixed in a tangible medium of expression from
which they can be reproduced.” See id.
8
Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 628 (quoting Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant-Appellant
Martha Graham School and Dance Foundation at 20, Graham IV (No. 02-9451(L))).
9
See id. at 628, 639–41.
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dances in danger of disappearing forever from the public eye.10
Although these concerns were not cited as reasons for the court’s
holding, their underlying presence was inescapable.
According to custom within the dance community, a
choreographer is presumed by her peers to “own” her
choreography, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.11
Choreographers creating under the auspices of nonprofit
organizations have previously willed their works to other parties
without question, and their beneficiaries, motivated by a respect
for the work and a desire to see it preserved and performed, have
licensed or sold the works to the companies for which the dances
had been created.12 In the present case, a rift between Protas and
the Center led to the legal challenge and a ruling that questions the
tradition and custom of a field subject to little prior legal
interference.
This Note uses the work-for-hire portion of the Graham ruling
as a catalyst for exploring the legalities and realities of control
within “artist-driven”13 nonprofit organizations. Part I introduces
the parties involved in the Graham dispute, defines “artist-driven”
nonprofit organizations, surveys the development of copyright
protection within the field of dance, and provides an overview of
the Graham case. Part II examines the relevant legalities of
control, focusing first on the application of the work-for-hire
doctrine to Graham’s works and then explaining related nonprofit
10

See Paul Ben-Itzak, If Protas Wins, Martha Will Die a Second Death, DANCE
INSIDER (May 7, 2002), at http://www.danceinsider.com/f2002/f0507_1.html
(“[P]ractically speaking, if the Graham work is consigned to Protas—a non-artist who has
never taken a dance class in his life, and who would have difficulty finding a real Graham
dancer to stage the work—it could indeed be relegated to the dustbin of history.”).
11
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
12
Alvin Ailey, José Limón, George Balanchine, and Jerome Robbins, for example, did
not leave their works to the nonprofit dance companies with which they were affiliated,
the Alvin Ailey American Dance Theater, José Limón Dance Company, and New York
City Ballet (Balanchine and Robbins), respectively. See infra notes 111–12 and
accompanying text.
13
An “artist-driven” organization’s programs and activities primarily revolve around
the work of a founding artist or artists. See discussion infra Part I.C. This Note will not
consider the rights of non-founding artists hired by nonprofit organizations, as these
artists more clearly resemble “employees.” They do not wield the same level of control
over the organization as do founding artists, and their rights are generally subject to
specific contract terms.
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and moral rights considerations that are significant in analyzing the
precedent set by this case. Part III interprets the Graham decision
through a prism of nonprofit, moral rights, and equitable
considerations and suggests that: (1) the economic rights of
nonprofit organizations ultimately benefit their founding artists; (2)
a constraint on an artist’s right to transfer copyright ownership at
the time of her death might be viewed as a fair exchange for the
benefits provided to the artist by a nonprofit organization; (3)
artistic control, which is not a feature of U.S. copyright law but is
often of primary concern to artists, may be analogous to the “moral
rights” recognized in other countries and, to a limited extent,
within the United States; and (4) founding artists generally have
the freedom and power to contract to retain rights to their works.
This Note concludes that the precedent set by the Graham
ruling, that copyright vests in a nonprofit employer in the absence
of an agreement to the contrary, does not necessarily undercut the
rights that are of primary concern to artists. Not only may this
presumed employer ownership be overruled by memorializing the
parties’ specific intentions in a written agreement, but it is also
possible that an artist’s primary interests may be better protected
by a nonprofit organization created by the artist specifically to
nurture, advance, and preserve her work.
I. SETTING THE STAGE
The artist is doom eager, but never chooses his fate. He is
chosen, and anointed, and caught.14
A. Martha Graham, the Center, and the School
Martha Graham, one of the leading dancers and choreographers
of the twentieth century, “forever changed the way American
performers move and dance.”15 She began dancing in the early

14

GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 118.
SACRAMENTO BEE, People of the Century: Candidates Biographies, at
http://www.sacbee.com/static/archive/news/projects/people_of_century/entertainers/inde
x.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005); see also Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v.
15
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1920s and by 1926, Graham had given her first public performance
of her own works, eventually forming a performance troupe that
became known as the Martha Graham Dance Company
(“Company”).16 The Company was run as a sole proprietorship,
and Graham’s choreography was initially financed by
commissions.17 Graham performed with the Company from its
inception until the late 1960s (at which time Graham was in her
seventies) and choreographed more than 180 works.18 “Her fierce
choreography sometimes amazed and sometimes horrified, but in it
she embodied modern dance—arrogantly and spectacularly.”19
When Graham began teaching in New York in 1926, she
developed her own system of dance movements and exercises

Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 512, 515 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff’d, 43 Fed. Appx. 408 (2d Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Graham I].
Her uniquely American vision and creative genius earned her numerous honors
and awards such as the Laurel Leaf of the American Composers Alliance in
1959 for her service to music. Her colleagues in theater, the members of the
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees Local One, voted her the
recipient of the 1986 Local One Centennial Award for dance, not to be awarded
for another 100 years. In 1976, President Gerald R. Ford bestowed upon
Martha Graham the United States’ highest civilian honor, the Medal of
Freedom, and declared her a “National Treasure,” making her the first dancer
and choreographer to receive this honor. Another Presidential honor was
awarded Martha Graham in 1985 when President Ronald Reagan designated
her among the first recipients of the United States’ National Medal of Arts.
Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Biography of Martha Graham, at
http://www.marthagrahamdance.org/us/#Bio (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) [hereinafter
Biography of Martha Graham].
16
See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 515.
17
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73
U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277). Early patrons of Graham included
Lila Acheson Wallace, Joan Davidson, Katharine Cornell, Baroness Bethsabée de
Rothschild, Doris Duke, and Halston. See GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 6, 134, 145–47, 181,
267–69; Anna Kisselgoff, Rebuilding the Martha Graham Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
1999, § 2, at 1.
18
See ABOUT MARTHA GRAHAM, MARTHA GRAHAM DANCE CO. AT CITY CENT.,
PLAYBILL, Vol. 120, No. 5 (May 2004). Graham’s last complete dance, Maple Leaf Rag,
was premiered in the year before Graham’s death. See PROGRAM NOTES, MARTHA
GRAHAM DANCE CO. AT CITY CENT., PLAYBILL, Vol. 120, No. 5 (May 2004).
19
Terry Teachout, The Time 100: Martha Graham, TIME, June 8, 1998, at 200,
available at http://www.time.com/time/time100/artists/profile/graham.html (last visited
Jan. 27, 2005).
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known as the Martha Graham Technique.20 “Using the principles
of contraction and release as the foundation for her technique,
Martha Graham built a vocabulary of movement that would
increase the emotional activity of the dancer’s body.”21 Around
1930, Graham opened the Martha Graham School of Dance, a sole
proprietorship through which she taught her Technique.22
Graham established the Martha Graham Foundation for
Contemporary Dance (“Foundation”) as a nonprofit corporation in
1948.23 “The Foundation was created to support modern dance by
promoting and disseminating the Martha Graham technique, as
well as raising funds for performances of the Martha Graham
Dance Company.”24 In 1956, Graham incorporated the Martha
Graham School of Contemporary Dance (“School”) and
subsequently sold her sole proprietorship dance school, including
its name, assets, and goodwill, to the newly incorporated School.25
20

See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 515; Biography of Martha Graham, supra note 15.
“I did not teach the technique classes that I learned at the Denishawn school [of Ruth St.
Denis and Ted Shawn] for the simple reason that I could not afford the five-hundreddollar fee they demanded from anyone who taught their method.” GRAHAM, supra note
1, at 120.
21
Biography of Martha Graham, supra note 15 (internal quotations omitted).
Martha left a magnificent legacy in a unique technique. . . . A technique of how
to train the interior of the body, the visceral center of the torso that reacts to the
range of emotional experience. Whether it is fear or anger or sobbing or
laughing, the center informs the rest of the movement and gives it a deep
resonance.
Dunning, supra note 1 (quoting Pearl Lang).
22
See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 515. Graham’s students included many who
would become major modern dance choreographers in their own right—Merce
Cunningham, Paul Taylor, and Twyla Tharp, to name a few—as well as actors such as
Bette Davis, Gregory Peck, Liza Minelli, Woody Allen, Joanne Woodward, and Tony
Randall. See also GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 120; Biography of Martha Graham, supra
note 15.
23
See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 515. The Foundation was incorporated under New
York state law. See id.
24
Id. at 525. “The Center was established for . . . the dual purposes of enabling the
creation and performance of choreography by Graham and perpetuating and preserving
Graham’s work after her death.” Brief for Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees at
10, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
25
Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
The purposes of the School, as stated in its certificate of incorporation were to,
inter alia, “teach the science and art of the dance,” and “in conjunction with the
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Graham was not employed by either organization in any capacity
prior to 1956,26 although eventually Graham’s works were
exclusively created through these organizations.27
In 1968, the Foundation’s name was changed to the Martha
Graham Center of Contemporary Dance.28 The Center served as
an umbrella organization for the incorporated School and the
unincorporated Company.29 Although separately incorporated, the
Center and the School largely operated as a single entity.30 By
1980, the two corporations filed combined statements and had
identical boards of trustees.31 Graham served as Artistic Director
and a board member of both the Center and the School from 1966
until her death in 1991.32 Graham’s responsibilities as Artistic
Director were “to create new dances, to maintain the repertory of
dances, to rehearse the company, and to supervise the School.”33
B. The Protas Factor
Ronald Protas met Martha Graham in 1967, when he was
twenty-six and she was seventy-three, and they developed a close
conduct of such school . . . to compose, perform and demonstrate, and to
commission the composition, performance and demonstration of dances,
ballets, dramas and music.”
Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, 380 F.3d 624 (2d
Cir. 2004) (quoting the School’s Certificate of Incorporation). Graham’s accountant had
advised her “to form this new not-for-profit entity because . . . contributions to the School
would be tax-deductible.” Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
26
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 637.
27
See id. at 629.
28
Id.
29
See id. at 629 n.2; Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 572. Today, the Center “provides
the Martha Graham School (a separate . . . organization that shares the same Board of
Trustees), the Martha Graham Dance Company and the Martha Graham Resources with
fundraising and marketing support and legal, financial and audit services.” Martha
Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Mission & Programs, at http://www.marthagrahamdance.org/us/#Mission (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).
30
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 629 n.2.
31
See id.; Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
32
See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d 512, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 43 Fed. Appx. 408
(2d Cir. 2002).
33
Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 573 (emphasis added). Judge Cedarbaum concluded
that Center board members “Francis Mason, Judith Schlosser, and Lee Traub . . . testified
credibly that Graham’s responsibilities during her employment included the creation of
dances.” Id.
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friendship.34 Although he had no prior training in dance, Protas
had become Executive Director of the Center and had joined the
boards of both the Center and the School by the mid-1970s; he
became Co-Associate Artistic Director of the Center around
1980.35
Protas eventually gained control of the board of
directors.36 Graham trusted Protas, “whom I have trained over the
years to oversee my works and to whom I have entrusted the future
of my company. . . . He knows deeply the roles I have created and
can intuit what I want.”37
When Graham died in 1991, Protas succeeded her as Artistic
Director of the Center and the School.38 Graham’s last will,
executed on January 19, 1989, did not specify what Graham owned
at the time of her death but named Protas as executor and residuary
legatee.39 Although Protas had been advised by his attorney and
others to investigate what rights he had acquired under Graham’s
will, he made no such investigation.40
Nevertheless, he
represented to his fellow directors at the Center that he owned the
exclusive rights to Martha Graham’s works.41 The other board
34

See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 629; Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
36
Cf. id. “Protas had the ‘final say’ on who could or could not be a board member: ‘He
put them on and took them off.’” Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 575 (quoting Center
board member Lee Traub).
37
GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 11.
38
See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
39
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 629; Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 576. Graham’s will
included the following provisions:
The residue . . . of all my property, real and personal, of every kind and
description and wherever situated, including all property over which I may
have power of appointment at the time of my death . . . and including all
property not otherwise effectively disposed of hereunder . . . I give, devise and
bequeath to my said friend, Ron Protas, if he shall survive me, or, if he shall not
survive me, to the Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Inc.
35

In connection with any rights or interests in any dance works, musical scores,
scenery sets, my personal papers and the use of my name, which may pass to
my said friend Ron Protas . . . I request, but do not enjoin, that he consult with
my friends, Linda Hodes, Diane Gray, Halston, Ted Michaelson, Alex Racolin
and Lee Traub, regarding the use of such rights or interests.
Id. (emphasis added).
40
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 630; Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
41
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 630.
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members trusted Protas and accepted his representations.42 In
1998, Protas created the Martha Graham Trust (“Trust”), of which
he was trustee and sole beneficiary, to license Graham’s works.43
In response to an increasingly strained relationship with Protas
and difficulty with fundraising, the Center attempted to persuade
Protas to resign as Artistic Director in July 1999 by entering into a
ten-year licensing agreement with the Trust.44 The licensing
agreement, inter alia, gave the Center a non-exclusive license to
perform Graham’s dances; in return, the Center agreed to keep
Protas on the board, pay him a salary for ten years, and credit him
as Artistic Consultant.45 An implicit term of the licensing
agreement was that Protas was to resign as the Center’s Artistic
Director.46 When Protas had not resigned nearly a year later, the
board voted to remove him as Artistic Director.47 Facing
continued financial problems, the Center suspended operations on
May 25, 2000.48 That same day, Protas terminated the license
agreement between the Trust and the Center.49 Protas was
removed from the Center’s board on June 22, 2000.50 “Following
Protas’ departure, the Center and the School received a significant
amount of funding . . . and a grant for the renovation of the

42

See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 577 (quoting board chairman Francis Mason).
“The [other directors] trusted him and relied on him to perform in good faith the high
duty of loyalty of a fiduciary. Protas had a fiduciary duty not to appropriate to himself
corporate opportunities that might belong to the [Center].” Id. at 610 (citing Sharp v.
Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 122 (1976)).
43
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 630.
44
See id.; Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 579; see also Deborah Jowitt, Dance—
Honoring the Founding Vision, and Moving On; When a Company’s Creator is Gone,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1998, § 2, at 1. “Mr. Protas, in his zeal to promote and protect
Graham and her masterpieces during her lifetime, seems to have offended quite a few
presenters and donors.” Id.
45
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 630. The licensing agreement also granted “the Center
an exclusive license to teach the Martha Graham technique, and a non-exclusive
license . . . to use sets, costumes[,] and properties; to use Graham’s images; and to use the
Martha Graham trademark.” Id.
46
See id.
47
See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
48
See id.
49
See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 580.
50
See id.
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Center’s and the School’s premises. . . . The School reopened on
January 16, 2001.”51
After his removal from the board of the Center, Protas founded
the nonprofit Martha Graham School and Dance Foundation
(“School and Dance Foundation”), to which the Trust granted an
exclusive license to license performances of Graham’s dances.52
Protas filed suit through the nonprofit Martha Graham School and
Dance Foundation on January 12, 2001, to enjoin the Center, inter
alia, from performing seventy of Graham’s dances choreographed
between 1926 and 1991.53
To understand the many facets of the case and the field’s
reaction to the ruling, it is essential to understand the general
structure of the field of dance and the development of copyright
protection for works of choreography.
C. Artist-Driven Organizations within the Nonprofit Rubric
“Artists are . . . inextricably tied to not-for-profit
organizations,” which provide a structure, a home, and financing
for artistic works.54 Most dance companies, including the Center,
are incorporated under state not-for-profit law55 and receive taxexempt status under the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”).56
51

Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
Id. The Trust also granted the School and Dance Foundation an exclusive license to
establish a school under Graham’s name. Id.
53
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624, 630 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73
U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277). Protas also sought to enjoin the
Center from using the Martha Graham trademark and teaching the Martha Graham
Technique. See id; Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 514; see also infra note 113 and
accompanying text. Protas also asserted rights to the costumes and sets from some of
Graham’s dances. See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 569.
54
Brief of Amici Curiae American Dance Festival, Inc. et al. at 3, Graham IV, 380
F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)).
55
The Center was incorporated under New York Membership Corporation Law, “the
statutory predecessor of the current Not-For-Profit Corporation Law.” Graham I, 153 F.
Supp. 2d at 515; see N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201(b) (McKinney 1997 &
Supp. 2005) (“A not-for-profit corporation . . . may be formed for any one or more of the
following non-business purposes: charitable, educational, religious, scientific, literary,
cultural . . . .”) (emphasis added).
56
See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2004) (requiring that an organization be “organized and
operated exclusively for [exempt purposes]. . .” to qualify for the tax exemption provided
for in the same section); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)-1(d) (1990). In addition to
52
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Federal tax exemption is granted to such organizations due to their
charitable purposes since they serve the public good rather than a
private interest.57 Arts and cultural organizations have been
recognized as having an educational purpose, one of the
enumerated exempt purposes in the Code.58 From an economic
perspective, the nonprofit structure may be an artist’s only
financial option, especially “where significant resources must be
marshaled for an artist’s vision to be realized.”59 Changes in the
available funding streams for the arts in the mid-twentieth century
increasingly channeled the formation of arts organizations into the
nonprofit structure.60 The majority of foundation and corporate
grant-making programs authorize donations only to nonprofit, taxtax exemption, arts organizations generally qualify to receive tax-deductible donations
under section 170 of the Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (2004). The tax deduction
for charitable contributions was adopted in 1917 in response to the fear that higher tax
rates would cause philanthropy to decline. See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARTZ,
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 308 (1st ed. 1995).
57
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (stating that an exempt organization must
serve “a public, rather than a private, interest”); see also generally Summers v. Cherokee
Children & Family Servs., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that two
nonprofit public benefit corporations formed to perform child care services of their
executive director had abandoned any public or charitable purposes).
58
See Rev. Rul. 64-175, 1964-1 C.B. 185. A nonprofit corporation organized “to
stimulate, promote, and develop the interest of the American public in the dramatic arts
and which operates a permanent repertory theatre” was found to be educational, much in
“the same manner as a symphony orchestra is considered educational.” Id. Symphony
orchestras are one of the examples of educational organization listed in the regulations.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii); see also Rev. Rul. 73-45, 1973-1 C.B. 220
(holding that “a nonprofit organization created to foster the development . . . of an
appreciation for drama and musical arts by sponsoring professional presentations
qualifies for exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Code”); Rev. Rul. 64-174, 1964-1
C.B. 183 (holding that a foundation established to create interest in American theatre was
an exempt organization under section 501(c)(3)).
59
Brief of Amici Curiae American Dance Festival, Inc. et al. at 3, Graham IV (No. 029451(L)).
60
See John Kreidler, Leverage Lost: The Nonprofit Arts in the Post-Ford Era, IN
MOTION MAG., Feb. 16, 1996, at pt. 2, http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/lost.html.
These changes included the establishment of arts grants by the Ford Foundation,
Carnegie Foundation, The Rockefeller Foundation, and The Andrew W. Mellon
Foundation, as well as the formation of the National Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) in
1965 (which led to the formation of state arts agencies in all states by 1980, followed by
the formation of more than 3000 local arts agencies). See id. Most NEA grants to arts
organizations also required matching support and served to stimulate a broad base of
funding from individual and institutional sources. See id.
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exempt organizations, and the tax deduction available to
individuals provides a strong incentive to restrict their philanthropy
to nonprofit organizations.61
The defining characteristic of a nonprofit organization is the
“nondistribution constraint” (also known as the “private inurement
doctrine”), which means that such organizations may not distribute
income or assets to shareholders, owners, directors, or officers.62
Just as the goal of a for-profit corporation is to make
money for its investors, the goal of a not-for-profit is to
make money that can be spent on furthering its [exempt
purpose] objectives. . . . What distinguishes a not-for-profit
is not whether it receives money, but what it does with the
money.63
Many choreographers are employed by nonprofit organizations
which they have founded. Such organizations are frequently
referred to as “artist-driven” organizations, and their programs and
activities primarily revolve around the work of their founding
artists.64 The primary purposes of such organizations are generally
to support, utilize, and preserve the work of the founding artist.65
A nonprofit organization is legally controlled by its board
members, who bear ultimate fiduciary responsibility for the
61

N.Y. Found. for the Arts, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.nyfa.org/level3.asp?id=64&fid=1&sid=44 (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) (“Individual artists and new
organizations face genuine obstacles when seeking the funding necessary to continue and
complete their work.”).
62
See VICTORIA B. BJORKLUND ET AL., NEW YORK NONPROFIT LAW AND PRACTICE:
WITH TAX ANALYSIS § 1-2 & n.16 (1997 & Supp. 2005); see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)
(2004) (stating that no part of the net earnings of an exempt organization may inure “to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual”); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW
§§ 102(a)(5), 204, 508, 515(a) (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2005).
63
BJORKLUND ET AL., supra note 62, § 1-2 n.17 (quoting Am. Baptist Churches of
Metro. N.Y. v. Galloway, 710 N.Y.S.2d 12, 15 (App. Div. 2000)).
64
See, e.g., Gregory Kandel, The Art in the Process of Planning, Nat’l Endowment for
the Arts, http://www.nea.gov/resources/Lessons/kandel1.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2004)
(listing a modern dance company that has a single choreographer as an example of an
artist driven organization).
65
The Center and the School, for example, are nonprofit “educational institutions
which contribute to the advancement of the art of dance and Martha Graham’s legacy.”
Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d 512, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 43 Fed. Appx. 408 (2d Cir.
2002).
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management of the organization.66
In many artist-driven
organizations, however, the board will defer to the wishes of the
founding artist.67 Deference to the artist may be justified as an
application of the board’s business judgment68 in serving the
mission of the organization, which often revolves around the
founding artist’s work.69
Graham exercised unfettered artistic control over the Center.70
Although the Center’s board of directors bore ultimate fiduciary
responsibility for the organization, the board did not interfere with
Graham’s artistic decisions and understood its role and the role of
the Center to be one of support for Graham.71 The board’s deferral
of control to Graham was a significant consideration both in the
court’s application of the work-for-hire doctrine and in the field’s
reaction to the ruling.

66

See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 701, 717 (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2005).
See, e.g., Jennifer Dunning, Suit Over Graham’s Dances Moves into a New Phase,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at E4 [hereinafter Dunning, Suit Over Graham’s Dances].
The Second Circuit conceded that “as the revered doyenne, Graham held remarkable
sway over the Center’s Board of Directors.” Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624, 640 (2d Cir.
2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277).
68
A board’s decisions will not be second-guessed by the court so long as the directors
discharge the duties of their positions “in good faith and with that degree of diligence,
care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances
in like positions.” N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a). Board members are
entitled to rely on the opinions of employees of the organization who are believed to be
“reliable and competent in the matters presented.” Id. § 717(b). As a result, board
members would be justified in relying on the opinions of an artistic director (such as
Graham) in making artistic decisions. Cf. id.
69
See, e.g., Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558, 574 (1994), aff’d, 37 F.3d
216 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Substantial domination of an organization by its founder does not
necessarily disqualify the organization from [tax-exempt status].”); see also Rev. Rul. 66259, 1966-2 C.B. 214 (noting that the mere fact that the creator of an organization has
control will not, in itself, prevent the organization from qualifying for exemption.).
70
See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
71
See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, 380 F.3d
624 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Dunning, Suit Over Graham’s Dances, supra note 67
(“Francis Mason, the chairman of the center’s board, described that organization as an
informal family that existed to enable Graham to create and maintain dances.”).
67
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D. Copyright Protection and the Field of Dance
1. Historic Overview
“Custom . . . draws its strength from the consent of those who
agree to be bound by it.”72 As members of a “close-knit, protective
community,”73 American choreographers have long yielded to their
self-imposed rules, and the custom of the dance community
continues to offer a means of recognizing and protecting the rights
of choreographers.74
There is little case law in the field of choreography.75 The few
early choreography cases dealt not with ownership or
infringement, but with whether the works at issue were even
eligible for copyright protection.76 Prior to the enactment of the
Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 Act”),77 choreographic works were
only eligible for copyright protection as a type of “dramatic
composition.”78 To qualify as such, the movement had to be used
to tell a story—abstract work was not eligible for protection79—
72

Barbara A. Singer, In Search of Adequate Protection for Choreographic Works:
Legislative and Judicial Alternatives vs. the Custom of the Dance Community, 38 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 287, 319 (1984).
73
Id. at 291.
74
See id. at 319.
75
See Anne K. Weinhardt, Copyright Infringement of Choreography: The Legal
Aspects of Fixation, 13 J. CORP. L. 839, 842 (1988). As of 1984, “not one case involving
a statutory copyright of choreography [had] yet reached an American court of law.”
Singer, supra note 72, at 290 n.12.
76
See Fuller v. Bemis, 50 F. 926, 929 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892) (denying copyright
protection to a choreographic work by modern dance pioneer Loie Fuller); see also
Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 921 (C.C. Cal. 1867). Although not specifically a
“choreography” case, Martinetti dealt with the issue of whether a play, which “cannot be
read . . . a mere spectacle [that] must be seen to be appreciated,” was eligible for
copyright protection. Id.
77
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2451 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
78
See Singer, supra note 72, at 298. The Regulations enacted under the Copyright Act
of 1909, which was superseded by the Copyright Act of 1976, allowed “choreographic
works of a dramatic character” to be registered under the section which provided for the
registration of “dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions.” See id. n.46 (citing Joseph
Taubman, Choreography under Copyright Revision: The Square Peg in the Round Hole
Unpegged, 10 PERF. ARTS REV. 219, 220 (1980)).
79
See Fuller, 50 F. at 929. In Fuller, copyright protection was denied to a work of
choreography by modern dance pioneer Loie Fuller since the work was found to be
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and the movement had to be “suited for public representation.”80
Congress’ reluctance to grant protection to choreographic works
may be attributable to the comparatively recent advent of written
dance notation and videotape, which provided a reasonable means
for fixing choreography in a tangible medium.81 The dance field
also faced general public “resistance to the acceptance of abstract,
non-literary dance as a worthy form of artistic expression.”82 Past
courts have interpreted the Constitutional mandate limiting
copyright protection to works that promote the “useful arts”83 as an
“invitation to judge the moral worth of choreographic works.”84 In
the 1886 case of Martinetti v. Maguire,85 the California circuit
court proclaimed that although the court did not “pretend to be the

“solely the devising of a series of graceful movements . . . telling no story, portraying no
character, depicting no emotion.” Id.
80
See Martinetti, 16 F. Cas. at 922 (“In conferring [the] privilege or monopoly [of
copyright] upon authors and inventors, I suppose that it is both proper and constitutional
for congress so to legislate, as to encourage virtue and discourage immorality.”).
81
See Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Leon I.
Mirell, Legal Protection for Choreography, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 792, 792–93 & nn.4–5
(1952)); see also Leslie Erin Wallis, The Different Art: Choreography and Copyright, 33
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1442, 1445–46 (1986).
82
Horgan, 789 F.2d at 160 (citing Leon I. Mirell, Legal Protection for Choreography,
27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 792, 806–07); see also Melanie Cook, Comment, Moving to a New
Beat: Copyright Protection for Choreographic Works, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1287, 1288–
94 (1977). “Concert dance in the United States didn’t command attention as a popular art
form until well into the 20th century.” Joseph Carman, Who Owns a Dance? It Depends
on the Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, at § 2, p. 28.
83
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings . . . .”).
84
Singer, supra note 72, at 299 & n.52 (citing Martinetti, 16 F. Cas. at 922 (finding
that an “‘exhibition of women “lying about loose” or otherwise’ was indecent, corrupt,
and in no way promoted the useful arts’”); Fuller, 50 F. at 92 (“The Fuller court was
likewise wary of the seductive effect created by modern dance pioneer Loie Fuller as she
swirled her skirts in her ‘Serpentine Dance.’”)) “As late as 1963 a court rejected
protection of a choreographic work on [morality] grounds.” Id. at 299 n.52 (quoting Dane
v. M & H Co., 136 U.S.P.Q. 426, 429 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (finding that a striptease
dance number did not “tend to promote the progress of science of the useful arts” where
the performance contained “nothing of a literary, dramatic or musical character which
[was] calculated to elevate, cultivate, inform, or improve the moral or intellectual natures
of the audience”)).
85
16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C. Cal. 1867).
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conservator of the public morals . . . it [was] the duty of all courts
to uphold public virtue.”86
With the passage of the 1976 Act, which for the first time
recognized choreography as a separate protectable category of
work,87 Congress finally acknowledged what choreographers had
long been aware of: that “choreography is neither drama nor
storytelling. It is a separate art.”88 Under the 1976 Act, all dances,
even those that are non-narrative, are eligible for copyright so long
as they are “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”89
The 1985 case of Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc.,90 which dealt
with the question of whether George Balanchine’s91 choreography
could be infringed by photographs of his work, was the first case in
which a choreographic copyright was alleged to have been
infringed under the 1976 Act.92 Infringement case law relating to
86

Id. at 922. Not all courts, however, have endorsed this puritanical view. See
generally Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [artistic creations], outside of
the narrowest and most obvious limits . . . [S]ome works of genius would be
sure to miss appreciation . . . It may be more than doubted, for instance,
whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure
of protection when seen for the first time.
Id. at 251–52.
87
See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2004). Section 102(a) provides that:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of
authorship include . . . (4) pantomimes and choreographic works . . . .
Id.
88
Nicholas Arcomano, The Copyright Law and Dance, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 11, 1981, § 2,
at 8 (quoting Agnes de Mille from a comment she submitted to the Copyright Office in
1959). Ms. de Mille further elaborated that dance “is an arrangement in time-space,
using human bodies as a unit design. It may or may not be dramatic or tell a story.” Id.
89
17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Dances are generally “fixed” on film, videotape, or notated
scores. See generally Weinhardt, supra note 75.
90
621 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev’d, 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986).
91
George Balanchine, along with Lincoln Kirstein, co-founded the school that would
serve as the incubator of the New York City Ballet in 1933. About NYCB, at
http://www.nycballet.com/about/aboutnycb.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). Balanchine
served as ballet master and chief choreographer of the company from its inception in
1948 until his death in 1983. See Horgan, 789 F.2d at 158.
92
See Wallis, supra note 81, at 1445 n.23.
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choreography continues to remain scarce,93 and breaches of dance
licensing agreements are rare as well.94 “Many choreographers
maintain that the threat of ostracism from the dance community is
sufficient to deter most potential breaches.”95 Therefore, custom
continues to act as a formidable regulatory force within the field.
For the vast majority of the field, there is little economic
incentive driving considerations of intellectual property; thus,
infringements rarely warrant litigation.96
“[T]he ‘economic
remuneration of choreographers’ ha[s] not kept pace ‘with their
creative achievements.’”97 Most choreographers make little from
the performance or licensing of their work, so a suit based on
actual damages or the infringer’s profits generally would be of
little value.98 “[W]hatever the legality of the situation, most of the
time the bottom line is the cost of litigation. ‘The copyright law
merely gives you the right to sue . . . . But lawsuits are enormously
expensive.’”99
Although choreographers have not often taken advantage of
their legal right to assert ownership of their works, the addition of
choreography to the Copyright Act was not in vain. Recognizing
choreography as a copyrightable form of expression has had great
symbolic value and was a major step in the struggle for recognition
of choreography as a unique and viable art form. Nevertheless, the
general elusiveness of dance continues to raise challenges in fitting
choreography into the system of copyright protection.
93

See Weinhardt, supra note 75, at 843. This remains true even though many
choreographic works have been filmed, or notated and registered with the Copyright
Office in the past decades. See id.
94
See Singer, supra note 72, at 295. As of the January 1984 publication of Ms.
Singer’s article, there were “apparently no recorded cases of actions for breach of a
choreographic licensing agreement.” Id. at 295 n.34.
95
Id. at 296 n.36.
96
See id. at 296.
97
Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 161 (citing Cook, supra note 82, at 1287).
98
See Singer, supra note 72, at 305. Under § 504 of the 1976 Act, a copyright owner is
entitled to recover either (i) actual damages and the infringer’s profits or (ii) statutory
damages that generally range from $750 to $30,000. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(b), 504(c)(1)
(2004). Statutory damages may be as high as $150,000 if the infringement is determined
to have been willful. See id. § 504(c)(2).
99
Leslie Bennetts, Pirating of “The Pirates of Penzance,” N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1982,
at C15 (quoting Wilford Leach, director of the New York Shakespeare Festival
production of “The Pirates of Penzance”).
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2. The Essence of “Owning” a Dance
Determining the economic value of a dance copyright is a
difficult task. The value rests in the potential to exploit the rights
secured by copyright by performing the work publicly, licensing
performance rights to other dancers or dance companies, allowing
the creation of derivative works of choreography, or authorizing
derivative works in other media such as film, videotape, or
television.100 It is often difficult to speculate what the future value
will be, especially at the moment of creation when—for the vast
majority of choreographers—the economic value may be minimal
or non-existent.101 Determining the future value of a dance
remains challenging even once a company or choreographer begins
to license and receive income from the work.102
In order to exploit the rights granted to a work of choreography
by copyright, resources beyond the copyright itself are required.
Access to the original work, one such resource, may be provided
through tangible media such as film, videotape, and/or a notated
score,103 or through the memory of the choreographer, original

100
Section 106 of the Copyright Act includes, among the exclusive rights protected by
copyright, the rights to reproduce the work in copies and phonorecords, to prepare
derivative works, to distribute copies to the public, and to perform and display the work
publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
101
Cf. DIANE M. ZORICH, MANAGING DIGITAL ASSETS: OPTIONS FOR CULTURAL AND
EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 88–89 (1999) (Assessing the economic value of creative
works requires consideration of the intended context and users of the work, the
associative value, the rights conveyed to others, current events and timely associations,
transformative use, and increased visibility.).
102
Cf. id. The José Limón Dance Foundation, for example, does not place a financial
value on its ownership of José Limón’s works, even though the company generates
considerable revenue through licensing fees and the restaging of these works. Interview
with Ann Vachon, Institute Director, Limón Institute, in New York, NY [hereinafter
Vachon Interview] (Apr. 1, 2004) (on file with author). “The idea of owning a dance as
property is relatively new.” Jennifer Dunning, Warning: Ephemeral but Private Property;
Notions of Ownership Tie Up Dance Legacies, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2000, at E1.
103
Notated dance scores function for dance the same way music scores function for
music; dance notation captures in writing the direction, level and timing of movement, as
well as the part of the body producing the movement. See Dance Notation Bureau,
Notation Basics, at http://www.scottsutherland.com/DNB (last visited Jan. 27, 2005);
Dance Notation Bureau, About DNB, at http://dancenotation.org/DNB (last visited Jan.
27, 2005) [hereinafter Dance Notation Bureau, About DNB].
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performers, or other parties familiar with the work.104 Beyond
access, utilization of the work requires the participation of
someone with the technical expertise to translate the work from the
film, videotape, score, or personal memory onto the bodies of
dancers.105 Financial resources also are required to fund the
reconstruction, resetting, and production of the work.106
There must be some connection between the copyright itself
and the other resources necessary to utilize the work, or the
copyright has no functional value. Nonprofit dance companies
make excellent repositories for such resources, and there is
enormous cultural value, beyond the economic value of the
copyright itself, to keeping the work alive in the repertoire of a
dance company.107 Carla Maxwell, Artistic Director of the
104

See Carman, supra note 82 (noting that “[a] distinct difference between the
preservation of dance and other artistic media is that choreography often depends on an
oral tradition to uphold its integrity through style, motivation and content”).
105
See Julie Charlotte Van Camp, Philosophical Problems of Dance Criticism 169 (Dec.
1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University), http://www.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/diss.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2005) (“[M]any companies are finding
themselves unable to perform certain works, because a rehearsal master who knows the
ballet is unavailable to teach it to the company.”).
106
Common costs for reconstruction and resetting include studio space, dancer fees, and
licensing fees; performance and/or documentation may incur additional costs, such as
theater rental and videographer fees. See generally Dance Notation Bureau, Staging from
the Score, at http://dancenotation.org/DNB (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
107
“[T]he longer ballets are out of circulation, the more difficult it is to recreate them.”
Carman, supra note 82.
Granted, these resources may also exist outside of an artist-driven nonprofit
institution. Organizations such as the nonprofit Dance Notation Bureau provide access to
dance works of the past and serve as clearinghouses for the rights and documentation
necessary to utilize choreographic works. See Dance Notation Bureau, About DNB, supra
note 103. The Dance Notation Bureau produces and houses notated dance scores by more
than 160 artists including George Balanchine, Paul Taylor, Antony Tudor, Bill T. Jones,
Doris Humphrey, William Forsythe, José Limón, and Laura Dean. Id. “Each year DNB
assists in staging some 40 works from scores.” Id.
The Balanchine Trust, a repository for the works of George Balanchine which was
created by his legatees, retains ballet masters to set Balanchine works on more than 150
companies around the world. See Carman, supra note 82.
Charles Woodford, son and heir of Doris Humphrey, who was not affiliated with a
dance company at the time of her death, has secured the future of her dances without
having a nonprofit organization at his disposal by utilizing the services of the Dance
Notation Bureau and actively pursuing notation, licensing, and the reconstruction of
Humphrey’s works on other dance companies. Telephone Interview with Charles
Woodford (Apr. 15, 2004) (on file with author); see also Dunning, supra note 102. To
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nonprofit dance company of José Limón, a contemporary of
Martha Graham, observed, “The overwhelming thing that hit us all
when Jos[é] died was that if we disbanded, an entire lifetime of
work was going to disappear.”108
Due to the specific dance knowledge required to utilize works
of choreography and to the lack of case law in the area of
choreographic copyright protection, the customary views of
ownership within the field carry great weight with choreographers.
3. Presumption of Ownership within the Field
Often, the fact that a choreographer owns and has the right to
control his choreography is taken for granted within the
contemporary American dance community.109 “[A]n artist in the
process of creation injects his spirit into the work and . . . the
artist’s personality . . . should therefore be . . . preserved.”110 This
presumption has been affirmed when other choreographers, who
had created dances under the auspices of nonprofit organizations,
left their works to other parties and their bequests were not
challenged.111 Following the deaths of José Limón in 1972,
George Balanchine in 1983, Alvin Ailey in 1989, and Jerome
Robbins in 1998, their beneficiaries licensed or sold the
choreographers’ works to the companies for which they were
created.112 The parties involved did not seek a legal determination
preserve works under such circumstances requires extreme dedication and commitment
on the part of the heir.
108
Jowitt, supra note 44. “Artists of [Limón’s] generation didn’t concern themselves
with business . . . ‘He really, really believed . . . that if he was good enough, somebody
was going to come up and give him money.’ . . . He named no successor to lead [the
company]. His will didn’t even mention his dances.” Id. (quoting Carla Maxwell,
Artistic Director of Limón’s company since 1978).
109
See supra note 4 and accompanying text. “As George Balanchine explained, ‘I can
do with my ballets whatever I like. They are mine . . . I made them . . . .’” Singer, supra
note 72, at 310 n.106 (citations omitted).
110
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
111
See Joseph Carman, Graham Center Victory, DANCE MAG., Nov. 1, 2002, at 20.
112
See Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1986); Jowitt, supra note
44; Alvin Ailey American Dance Theater, History, 1989, at http://alvinailey.org/history.asp?dateid=29 (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
“Balanchine’s . . . will . . . left selected ballets to treasured dancers associated with
them. He also willed a bit of chaos to his legatees.” Jowitt, supra note 44. He divided
his body of work among several people, even splitting the American, foreign, and media
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of copyright ownership; thus, the legal standard was not called into
question.
Respecting the custom of the field, the Center would likely
have continued to pay Protas a licensing fee for use of Graham’s
works while allowing him to reap the profits of licensing the works
to other companies. Graham’s right to leave her dances to Protas
would have remained unquestioned had Protas not attempted to
deny the Center access to the works.
E. Overview of the Martha Graham Copyright Case113
In January 2001, Protas filed suit against the Center and School
under section 2201(a) of title 28 of the U.S. Code, seeking a
rights of single ballets among different people. See id. “Fortunately all of us cared for
Mr. Balanchine, and all of us care for each other.” Id. (quoting Barbara Horgan,
Balanchine’s executor). The legatees created the George Balanchine Trust, which has
streamlined the process of licensing Balanchine’s works. See Carman, supra note 82.
After Jerome Robbins’s death, “he left his ballets in the hands of a trust that specified that
a committee composed of trustees, ballet masters, and his close friends should oversee
the licensing of his ballets.” Id. “Generally meeting once a month, the Trust reviews
requests for staging Robbins’s works.” Id. The board of the Alvin Ailey American Dance
Theater “bought the rights to Ailey’s dances from his mother, to whom [Ailey] had left”
his work. See Dunning, supra note 102. “The board felt the dances had to be owned by a
nonprofit institution and not a single person who could sell [Ailey’s masterwork]
Revelations to the Rockettes.” Id. (quoting Sharon Luckman, executive director of the
Ailey company). José Limón’s heirs sold the rights to Limón’s work to the José Limón
Dance Foundation, the parent organization of the Limón Dance Company. Vachon
Interview, supra note 102; see also Dunning, supra note 102.
Of course, the specific facts of the relationship between the choreographer and the
dance company in each of the above situations may distinguish these choreographers’
rights from those of Graham. In the case of Balanchine, for example, the New York City
Ballet paid Balanchine a royalty each time the company performed his works. See
Horgan, 789 F.2d at 158. In Graham, the district court found that no credible evidence
was offered to prove that Graham received royalties from the Center for use of her
dances. See Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624, 641 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73
U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277).
113
The Martha Graham copyright case was the second phase of Protas’s suit. See
generally Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, 380 F.3d 624
(2d Cir. 2004). The first phase of the suit dealt with trademark claims: Protas attempted
to enjoin the Center and School from using the names under which they had been
incorporated and from claiming to teach the “Martha Graham technique.” See Graham I,
153 F. Supp. 2d 512, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 43 Fed. Appx. 408 (2d Cir. 2002).
Protas was unsuccessful on all counts. See Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v.
Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 43 Fed. Appx. 408, 410 (2d Cir. 2002)
[hereinafter Graham II]; Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 526–27.
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declaratory judgment that: (1) none of the seventy dances in
question were in the public domain, (2) he owned all rights in these
works, and (3) unauthorized performance of these dances would
constitute willful copyright infringement.114
The Center
counterclaimed for a declaration of ownership of the works in
question, arguing that it owned the dances via Graham’s
assignment and the work-for-hire doctrine, and thus, Protas had not
inherited any rights to these works.115 New York State Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer intervened on behalf of the Center to protect
the interests of the citizens of New York in the assets of this New
York state nonprofit corporation.116
The bench trial held in April 2002 before Judge Miriam
Goldman Cedarbaum of the District Court for the Southern District
of New York was “an effort to recapture a history that partially
predated the knowledge and memory of the living witnesses.”117
The specific circumstances of each work further complicated the
district court’s analysis. Some works were governed by the
Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”), others by the 1976 Act; some
were created before the Center was established, others after; some
had been published, others had not.118 Additionally, the critical

114

See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 630–31.
See id. at 631. The Center also counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud,
and negligent misrepresentation by Protas and for replevin of items possessed and money
improperly borrowed by Protas. See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 570. The Center
sought “a constructive trust to recover the proceeds of [Protas’s] licensing of the ballets,
sets, and costumes to third parties and of his sale of defendants’ property to the Library of
Congress [and] disgorgement of ten years of Protas’ salary and of payments made to
Protas by defendants under [the] 1999 license agreement.” Id.
116
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 631 (stating that the Center’s position was supported by
Attorney General Spitzer); Paul Ben-Itzak, Who Owns Martha Graham? Protas Gets His
Close Up, and Dancers Get Their Day in Court, DANCE INSIDER (Mar. 24, 2001) (“[T]he
citizens of New York have an interest and investment in the outcome of the case.”), at
http://www.danceinsider.com/f2001/f324.html. Attorney General Spitzer’s office had
previously tried to mediate the dispute. See Doreen Carvajal, A State Grant Could Help
Save Graham Studio, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2000, at E1.
117
Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 570–71.
118
“The copyright claims in this case have to be assessed through the prism of the
changes in the copyright law that took effect in 1978, 1989, and 1992. The chronology of
creation, publication, and copyright registration and renewal of the choreography of each
dance is critical to a determination of copyright ownership.” Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d
at 582–83 (citations omitted). For a complete overview of the issues presented by this
115
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events of this litigation spanned sixty-five years and “many of the
pertinent facts [were] obscured by inadequate record keeping.”119
Also informing the district court’s decision was the fact that, “after
listening to his evasive and inconsistent testimony and observing
his demeanor, [Judge Cedarbaum found] Protas not to be a credible
witness.”120
The district court overwhelmingly found in favor of the Center,
holding that forty-five dances were owned by the Center.121
Thirty-four dances created by Graham while she was employed by
the School or the Center between 1956 and 1991 were found to
have been works for hire.122 The district court found that the
Center held the copyrights to only twenty-seven of these thirtyfour dances because seven dances had been published without
sufficient evidence as to whether there was copyright notice.123
The district court also found that Graham had assigned a total of
twenty-one of her earlier unpublished works to the Center.124
Although there was no evidence of a written assignment by
Graham, the district court held that “a preponderance of the
credible evidence” established the transfer of the common law
copyright in these unpublished works.125 This evidence included
letters, documents, contracts with third parties, minutes of the
Center’s board of directors meetings, financial records, and witness
case, see David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, Shall We Dance?: Choreographic
Works and ‘Martha Graham,’ 228 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2002).
119
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 629.
120
Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 572. Although the trial was not officially about who
deserved to own the works, the plaintiff’s “erratic, ingratiating, spiteful, dissembling, unmindful, vindictive, simpering and quite possibly demented personality [was] also on
trial.” Paul Ben-Itzak, If Protas is Defeated, Would Dancers Win the Battle but Lose the
War?, DANCE INSIDER (Apr. 26, 2002), at http://www.danceinsider.com/f2002/f0426_1.html.
121
See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 612. The district court’s ruling as to each dance
is detailed in the Appendix to the Second Circuit’s decision. Graham IV, 380 F.3d at
647–48.
122
See id. at 592.
123
See id. at 594.
124
See id. at 597.
125
Id. at 596–97. “[T]he transfer of the ‘common law copyright’ in unpublished works
did not have to be in writing but could be oral or inferred from conduct.” Id. at 596
(quoting Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Warner Bros., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 172, 174 (S.D.N.Y.
1982)).
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testimony showing that the Center consistently acted as the owner
of these dances and that Graham did not object.126 Eighteen of the
twenty-one assigned works were held to presently belong to the
Center.127 The district court held that neither party had established
ownership of twenty-four dances, ten of which had entered the
public domain for lack of timely renewal, five of which were
commissioned works, and nine of which were published but for
which neither side had proven whether they had been published
with adequate notice of copyright.128 Protas established ownership
of one dance.129 As executor of Graham’s estate he was entitled to
the renewal term in one dance originally assigned to the Center and
subsequently published with notice of copyright in 1969.130
The appeal was argued before the Second Circuit on January
29, 2004.131 The Second Circuit largely upheld the district court’s
work-for-hire ruling, disagreeing primarily in the application of the
work-for-hire doctrine to ten works choreographed by Graham
between 1956 and 1965 while she was a part-time employee of the
School.132 The Second Circuit also disagreed with the district
court’s determination that two works were unpublished.133 The
case was remanded to the district court for a determination of
ownership of seven of the ten dances created between 1956
126

See id. at 598–600.
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 631; Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 612. Present
ownership of two of the twenty-one assigned works was not established because they
were subsequently published and neither party established whether they had been
published with adequate notice of copyright. See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
Protas was found to own the one remaining assigned work. See infra notes 129–30 and
accompanying text.
128
See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 612–13. Both parties requested that the Second
Circuit clarify whether the fourteen works for which ownership remained unproven (the
five commissioned works and the nine lacking evidence of adequate statutory notice)
were in the public domain or whether there remained a possibility of proving ownership.
See Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant-Appellant Martha Graham School & Dance
Found. at 64–66, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 (No. 02-9451(L)); Brief for DefendantsCounter-Claimants-Appellees at 67, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 (No. 02-9451(L)). The
Second Circuit, however, simply affirmed the district court’s ruling that neither party had
established ownership of these dances. See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 637 n.25, 647–48.
129
See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
130
See id. at 602.
131
Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 624.
132
See id. at 628, 637–39, 647; discussion infra notes 158–61.
133
See id. at 637, 640, 642.
127
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through 1965 and the two dances that were incorrectly held to be
unpublished.134 A remand hearing has been scheduled for May
2005.135
A petition for a writ of certiorari was filed by Protas on March
21, 2005, challenging the Second Circuit’s work-for-hire holdings
and questioning “[w]hether the work-for-hire doctrine can divest
an artist from the ownership of her body of work in situations
where that artist has established a not-for-profit entity to facilitate
the creation and presentation of those same works.”136 Both the
Center and Intervener Eliot Spitzer have waived their right to
respond to the petition.137 As this Note went to press, the Supreme
Court had not yet ruled on the certiorari petition.
II. LEGALITIES OF CONTROL: WORKS FOR HIRE, NONPROFITS, AND
MORAL RIGHTS
A. The Right to Control and the Work-for-Hire Doctrine
Congress has not fully defined the term “author” as used in the
Copyright Act, although both the 1909 and 1976 Acts state that an
employer is considered the “author” in the case of works made for
hire.138 “[W]ith respect to works for hire, the employer is legally

134
See id. at 647; see also discussion infra notes 162–65. The district court also was
instructed to recalculate the amount of Protas’ proceeds from the licensing of the works
determined to belong to the Center, that the Center is entitled to recover in light of its
findings on remand in determining ownership of these nine dances. See id. at 646–47; see
also supra note 115.
135
Petition of Writ of Certiorari, 2005 WL 682101 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277)
(appeal from Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004)).
136
Id. The second question presented for review was “[w]hether the conflict between
the . . . Second and Ninth Circuits with respect to scope of the work-for-hire doctrine as
applied to copyrights of creative works should be resolved in favor of Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation?” Id.
137
Docket for No. 04-1277, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-1277.htm
(last visited Apr. 22, 2005). Attorney General Spitzer’s waiver of right to respond was
filed on March 31, 2005; the Center’s waiver was filed on April 6, 2005. Id.
138
See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (“In the case of a work made
for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the
author for purposes of this title . . . .”); Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1909)
(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)) (“[In] the interpretation and construction of
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regarded as the ‘author,’ as distinguished from the creator of the
work, whom Learned Hand referred to as ‘the “author” in the
colloquial sense.’”139 The Supreme Court has defined “author” in
this sense to be “[h]e to whom anything owes its origin; originator,
maker.”140
Under both the 1909 and 1976 Acts, the work-for-hire doctrine
embraces the tenet that in a typical employer-employee
relationship, the employer has some right of control over the
creation of a work by an employee.141 Although “no one sells or
mortgages all the products of his brain to his employer by the mere
fact of employment,”142 the Center’s right to control Graham’s
work, as her employer, was a factor in determining that the workfor-hire doctrine applied.143 As the Second Circuit highlighted in
its opinion, so long as the employer has the right to supervise the
manner in which a work is created, the fact that the employer did

this title . . . the word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the case of works made for
hire.”).
139
Graham IV, 380 F.3d at. at 634 (quoting Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123
F.2d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 1941)).
140
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); see also Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (holding that the term “author” is not to be
construed in its “narrow literal sense, but, rather, with the reach necessary to reflect the
broad scope of constitutional principles”). Because the Center financially enabled the
creation of Graham’s works, the works at least partially “owed their origin” to the Center.
Compare Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58, with Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B. 627 (1883)
(quoted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60–61) (stating that an
author “is the person who effectively is as near as he can be, the cause of the picture
which is produced . . . the person who has superintended the arrangement, who has
actually formed the picture by putting persons in position and arranging the place where
the people are to be.”).
141
See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989)
(establishing that, for works created under the 1976 Act, the extent of the employer’s
control is a factor to be considered in determining whether a party is an employee under
the common law of agency); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir.
1995) (quoting Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972))
(holding that in applying the “instance and expense” test to works created under the 1909
Act, “an essential element of the employer-employee relationship, [is] the right of the
employer to direct and supervise the manner in which the writer performs his work”).
142
Pub. Affairs Assocs. v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 604 (D.D.C. 1959), rev’d on
other grounds, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated for insufficient record, 369 U.S.
111 (1962).
143
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 633–42.
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not exercise control does not preclude application of the work-forhire doctrine.144
1. Works for Hire under the 1909 Act
a) The “Instance and Expense” Test
An employer-employee relationship signifying work-for-hire
status for works created under the 1909 Act is determined through
application of the “instance and expense” test, first utilized by the
Second Circuit in Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill
Publishing Co.,145 which held that when an employee’s work was
created at the employer’s instance and expense and the intent of
the parties could not be determined, the presumption of copyright
ownership ran in favor of the employer.146 These principles were
found to apply to both the traditional employer-employee
relationship as well as in the relationship of employer and
independent contractor.147 The Second Circuit has since defined
the “instance and expense” test as being met when the employer
both induced the creation of the work and had the right to direct
and supervise how the work was executed.148 Significantly, “[t]he

144

See id. at 635 (citing Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500–01 (2d Cir.
1969)), 642 (citing Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 85–88 (2d Cir. 1995)).
145
369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966).
146
See id. at 567–68 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 588
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Brattleboro, 369 F.2d
at 568). The Second Circuit traced the use of the phrase “instance and expense” in
copyright jurisprudence back to the 1887 case of Hanson v. Jaccard Jewelry Co., 32 F.
202, 202 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1887). See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 635 n.17. “[T]he phrase was
first used in an operative sense in a provision of a [1905] draft bill prepared by . . .
Thorvald Solberg, then the Register of Copyrights,” that would have offered protection
for a “composite or collective work . . . produced at the instance and expense of a
publisher.” Id. (citation omitted). The next use of the phrase was found in the 1964
edition of Nimmer on Copyright. See id. The phrase first appeared in a reported opinion
in 1965: Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965). See
id.
147
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 635 (citing Brattleboro, 369 F.2d at 568).
148
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Siegel v.
Nat’l Periodical Publ’ns, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1974); Picture Music, Inc. v.
Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972)).
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right to direct and supervise the manner in which work is created
need never be exercised.”149
b) The “Instance and Expense” Test as Applied to
Graham’s Works (1956–1977)
i. District Court
In holding that nineteen dances choreographed by Graham
from 1956 through 1977 were works for hire, the district court
found the “expense” test to be satisfied because Graham
choreographed on dancers employed by the Center; thus, the tools
used to create Graham’s choreographic works were provided by
the Center.150 Graham herself had recognized that “[she] could
never have done what [she did] if [she] had not had such a
place.”151 While acknowledging that it was “undisputed that
Martha Graham was ultimately responsible for making all final
artistic decisions relating to the dances,”152 the court found the
“instance” test to be satisfied as well, holding that the fact that “the
Center’s board of directors did not interfere with Graham’s artistic
decisions does not show that it did not have the legal authority, as
her employer, to ensure that dances were created at the ‘instance’
of the defendants.”153
ii. Second Circuit
On appeal, Protas contended that Graham was not an employee
within the scope of the 1909 Act since “she choreographed at no
one’s instance but her own.”154 The Second Circuit found,
however, that whether Graham would have choreographed without
her salary and the support of the Center was irrelevant, and that
Protas attempted to give the word “instance” a “more
particularized meaning” than appropriate for the instance and
expense test, which does not require that the employer be the
149

Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 635 (citing Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497,
500–01 (2d Cir. 1969)).
150
See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 589–90 (“The creation of the dances was a
collaborative process in which the Center’s employees played an indispensable role.”).
151
Id. at 589.
152
Id. at 590.
153
Id.
154
Id.
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“precipitating force” behind each work created by an employee.155
“Many talented people . . . are expected by their employers to
produce the sort of work for which they were hired, without any
need for the employer to suggest any particular product. ‘Instance’
is not a term of exclusion as applied to specific works created
within the scope of regular employment.”156 The fact that Graham
was paid by the Center specifically to create the intellectual
property at issue in this litigation was significant in finding that a
work-for-hire relationship existed.157
Despite the Second Circuit’s agreement with the district court’s
application of the instance and expense test, it concluded that the
district court erred in finding ten works choreographed by Graham
from 1956 through 1965 to be works for hire.158 Per Graham’s
employment contract, she was employed by the School during that
period only to teach and supervise the School’s education program
as part-time Program Director, despite the fact that part of the
School’s purpose was the creation of dances.159 There was no
evidence that her duties included choreography, while there was
evidence that during this period Graham received income from
155

See id. at 640. But see Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of
Self-Realization, 206 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that writings by a monk
who founded his own religious order were “motivated by [his] own desire for selfexpression or religious instruction of the public” and therefore did not qualify as works
for hire under the 1909 Act). The Second Circuit distinguished the employee in SelfRealization Fellowship Church from Graham in that Swami Paramahansa Yogananda had
much less of a connection to his putative employer church than would an employee in a
traditional employment relationship. Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624, 640 (2d Cir. 2004),
petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277).
Additionally, while Graham’s choreography was clearly part of the regular business of
the Center, see infra note 190 and accompanying text, the Swami’s writings were not
necessarily part of the regular business of the Self-Realization Fellowship Church. Cf.
Aims & Ideals of Self-Realization Fellowship (listing the aims and ideals of the Church
as set forth by founder Paramahansa Yogananda), at http://www.yogananda.com/aboutsrf/aims_ideals.html (last updated Sept. 12, 2000). Although the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion did not define the regular business of the Church, whether the “employee created
the work as part of the regular course of business of the employer” was mentioned as a
consideration in establishing a work-for-hire relationship. See Self-Realization
Fellowship Church, 206 F.3d at 1326–27 (citation omitted).
156
Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 640–41.
157
See id. at 640.
158
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 637.
159
See id. at 637–38.
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other sources for her choreography.160 Although the resources
provided by the Center, including rehearsal space and dancers,
may have aided Graham in her choreography—arguably satisfying
the “expense” test—“no dances were proved to have been created
before 1966 at the ‘instance’ of the Center.”161
The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling with
respect to seven unpublished works created during this
timeframe.162 The question of the ownership of these dances was
remanded to the district court to determine if Graham had assigned
any of these dances to the Center or whether the works had passed
to Protas as part of Graham’s estate.163 As to the remaining three
works created from 1956 through 1965, which the Second Circuit
determined not to be works for hire, the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court’s holding that two of these works belonged to
neither the Center nor Protas because it had not been sufficiently
proven that the works had been published with the required
statutory notice of copyright.164 The Second Circuit reversed the
district court’s holding with respect to the third work, determined
to have been published with copyright notice, because even if
Graham has assigned the renewal term for that work to the Center,
her death prior to the beginning of the renewal term would have
voided such assignment; therefore, this work had passed to Protas
as Graham’s beneficiary.165
The Second Circuit upheld the district court’s work-for-hire
finding with respect to the nine works created from 1966 through
1977, finding that Graham had signed a new ten-year contract with
the Center in 1966 that changed her status to full-time Artistic
Director of the Center.166 After this contract was signed, Graham’s
“primary duty was to choreograph new dances.”167 This contract

160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

See id.
Id. at 638.
Id.
Id. at 638–39; see also supra note 135 and accompanying text.
See id. at 638.
See id. at 645.
See id. at 639.
See id. at 640.
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was renewed indefinitely in 1976 and remained in effect until
Graham’s death in 1991.168
2. Works for Hire under the 1976 Act
a) “Employee” Status under the Common Law of Agency
Under the 1976 Act, there is a presumption of ownership by the
employer, unless contracted otherwise in writing.169 To ascertain
whether a work created on or after January 1, 1978, is a work for
hire, the determinative question is whether it was “prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment.”170
Definitions for “employee” and “scope of employment” are
lacking under the 1976 Act,171 but the Supreme Court has held that
“the term ‘employee’ should be understood in light of the general
common law of agency.”172 Work is within an employee’s “scope
of employment” if (1) it is of the kind the employee was hired to
perform, (2) its creation occurs substantially within the authorized
time and space limits of the job, and (3) it was at least partially
motivated by a desire to serve the employer. 173
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,174 the
Supreme Court listed twelve factors to consider in determining
whether a party is an employee under the common law of agency:
(1) the right to control the manner and means of production, (2) the
necessary skill, (3) the source of the instrumentalities and tools, (4)
the location of the work, (5) the duration of the relationship, (6) the
right to assign additional projects, (7) control over when and how
168

See id. at 639.
See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000). This section provides:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and unless
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
Id. (emphasis added).
170
Id. § 101; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, § 102, 90 Stat. 2541, 2598 (1976).
171
See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 1995).
172
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989).
173
See Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958)).
174
490 U.S. 730 (1989).
169
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long to work, (8) the method of payment, (9) the choice and
compensation of assistants, (10) the regular business of the hiring
party, (11) employee benefits provided, and (12) tax treatment.175
“No one of these factors is determinative.”176 The Reid Court
“held that ‘employee’ should not be interpreted exclusively in
terms of whether the hiring party retains the right to control the
product, nor in terms of whether the hiring party has actually
wielded control over the creation of the work.”177
In Aymes v. Bonelli,178 the Second Circuit subsequently
narrowed the list to five factors that “will be significant in virtually
every situation . . . and should be given more weight in the
analysis:” (1) requisite skill, (2) the right of the hiring party to
control the manner and means of production, (3) whether the hired
party may be assigned additional projects, (4) tax treatment of the
hired party, and (5) provision of employee benefits.179
b) Agency Factors as Applied to Graham’s Works (1978–
1991)
i. District Court
The status of fifteen of Graham’s works, choreographed from
1978 through 1991, was assessed under the 1976 Act.180 A
balancing of the Aymes factors by the district court showed that
Graham was an employee of the Center.181 Although Graham’s
level of skill was uncontested, the court found that the board
exercised its control “in all the ways it saw fit while giving
deference to Graham’s talent as a choreographer.”182 The board
175

See id. at 751–52 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958)).
Id. at 752.
177
Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, 380 F.3d 624
(2d Cir. 2004) (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 742–43).
178
980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
179
Id. at 861.
180
See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 587, 590–92.
181
See id. at 591.
182
Id. at 592 (“Graham reported regularly to the board on her new works, and the board
set the financial bounds within which she could work.”). The Second Circuit has held
that a sculpture created by artists who “had complete artistic freedom with respect to
every aspect of the sculpture’s creation,” was a work made for hire. See Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 86–87 (2d Cir. 1995).
176
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also “encouraged her to produce new work, and occasionally
suggested themes for new dances.”183 Graham received a salary
from the Center as Artistic Director, from which taxes were
withheld, and the Center paid personal, travel, and medical
expenses and other employee benefits on her behalf.184
The court also applied additional factors from Reid which
further supported its determination of Graham’s employee
status.185
The Center was the “source of [Graham’s]
instrumentalities and tools,” as it paid for the dancers, pianists,
sets, and costumes and provided the rehearsal space.186 The
“location of the work” was the defendants’ premises.187 The
“duration of the relationship” was more than three decades of
employment.188 The “method of payment” was a fixed annual
salary, set by the board of directors, “with no separate
compensation for the creation of dances.”189 And the creation of
dances by Martha Graham was part of the “regular business” of the
Center.190
These factors pointed “overwhelmingly to the
conclusion that Graham was an employee of the defendants.”191

183

Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
See id. at 573. Graham’s salary was described as “‘several hundred a week’ when
there was money.” Dunning, Hearings Start, supra note 4 (quoting Cynthia Parker
Kaback, general manager of the Center from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s).
185
See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 592; see also supra text accompanying supra
note 175.
186
Id. (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989)).
187
See id.
188
See id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. Interestingly enough, in considering when a work that was “specially ordered or
commissioned” (as opposed to created by an employee within the scope of his
employment) is entitled to work–for-hire status under 17 U.S.C. § 101(2), the Register of
Copyrights has stated that visual artists and photographers were “among the most
vulnerable and poorly protected of all the beneficiaries of the copyright law, and it seems
clear that, like serious composers and choreographers, [these artists] were not intended to
be treated as ‘employees’ under the carefully negotiated definition in section 101.” Reid,
490 U.S. at 747 n.13 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECOND
SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF THE REG. OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN. REVISION OF U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW ch. XI, at 12–13 (1975)).
184
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ii. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion
that Graham’s dances created from 1978 through 1991 were works
for hire.192 Conceding that the Center did not exercise much
control over Graham, the Second Circuit focused on the fact that
“the absence of a hiring party’s exercise of control does not mean
that an artist is not an employee where other factors weigh in favor
of finding an employment relationship.”193
Thus, while
recognition of Graham’s artistic genius would explain the Center’s
disinclination to exercise control over her choreography, such
uncontested artistic skill would not preclude a finding of an
employment relationship for purposes of the work-for-hire
doctrine.194
B. The Significance of Control within Nonprofit Organizations
An additional prism through which to interpret the Graham
case is the nonprofit structure of the Center. Moving beyond the
legal issue of Graham’s “employee” status, she was undisputedly
the founder and artistic director of the nonprofit Center, a member
of its board of directors, and, in practice if not legally, the person
with primary control over the organization.195
Graham’s
leadership role was significant because her control over the Center
could have potentially raised fiduciary duty and private inurement
issues in connection with the ownership and use of her works
during her lifetime. Although not raised in the Graham case, these
considerations could strengthen the equitable rationale for allowing
ownership to vest in the Center.

192

See Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624, 641 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73
U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277).
193
Id. at 642 (citing Carter v. Helmsley Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 85–88 (2d Cir. 1995))
(emphasis added).
194
See id. “The Restatement offers the example of a ‘full-time cook’ over whose
culinary activity ‘it is understood that the employer will exercise no control.’” Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) cmt. d (1958)).
195
See supra notes 67–68; Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d 512, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d,
43 Fed. Appx. 408 (2d Cir. 2002).
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1. Fiduciary Duty
New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law requires that
nonprofit directors and officers “discharge [their] duties . . . in
good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which
ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances
in like positions.”196 The district court found that by virtue of his
role as a board member and as principal managerial employee of
the Center, “Protas had a fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty to the
Center and the School.”197 The Second Circuit affirmed that he
violated this duty and profited improperly at the Center’s expense
when he failed to investigate what he owned under Graham’s will
(as he had been advised to do by his attorney) and represented to
the other board members that he owned Graham’s dances.198 In
doing so, he “failed to exercise the ‘degree of diligence, care and
skill’ required of directors and officers of not-for-profit
corporations.”199
The board of the Center had a comparable fiduciary duty to
uphold the mission of the organization by protecting and
preserving Graham’s work.200 This duty provided a strong
motivation for the Center’s position in the Graham case; the board
could not allow Protas to endanger the existence of the Center by
removing Graham’s works from the Company’s repertoire.

196

N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2005).
Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d 512, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 43 Fed. Appx. 408
(2d Cir. 2002) (citing Aramony v. United Way of Am., No. 96 Civ. 3962, 1998 WL
205331, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 1998) (“As chief executive officer of UWA, Aramony
owed the organization and its members a fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty.”)). Protas’s
position as Artistic Director of the Center “carried with it an implied promise to act in the
Center’s best interest.” Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 646.
198
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 630; Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 609 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
199
Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 609. “These assertions were, at best, irresponsibly
made, and, at worst, intentionally misleading.” Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 646.
200
See BJORKLUND ET AL., supra note 62, § 11-4(a) (“One of a director’s basic
responsibilities is to ensure that the mission of the organization . . . is carried out.”). “It is
firmly established that the directors of a corporation have the fiduciary obligation to act
on behalf of the corporation in good faith and with reasonable care so as to protect and
advance its interests.” Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 608 (citing Pebble Cove
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Shoratlantic Dev. Co., 595 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (App. Div. 1992)).
197
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Martha Graham—as founder, artistic director, and member of
the board—was bound by a similar duty to the Center. This duty
required her to place the interests of the Center above her own.201
Since the Center was founded to promote and disseminate
Graham’s work,202 Graham and the Center shared a common
purpose. By furthering her own artistic interests, Graham was also
furthering the interests of the Center.203 Had she made an attempt
to personally profit from works created with Center resources at
the expense of the Center, however, a duty of loyalty question
might have been raised.204 Simply owning the copyright in her
works should not have called this duty into question, but private
economic exploitation of the rights secured by copyright, to the
detriment of the Center, might have raised a question of whether
the assets of the Center had been “distributed” to Graham in
violation of the nondistribution constraint.205 During Graham’s
lifetime, her ability to exploit her rights in her choreography may
have been limited by her leadership role within the Center.

201
See Aramony, 1998 WL 205331, at *7; see also S.H. & Helen R. Scheuer Family
Found., Inc. v. 61 Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (App. Div. 1992) (citation omitted)
(“[I]t is well established that, as fiduciaries, board members bear a duty of loyalty to the
corporation and ‘may not profit improperly at the expense of the corporation.’”).
202
See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
203
C.f. id. at 526.
204
A contract or transaction between a nonprofit organization and one of it its directors
or officers is allowed if the director’s or officer’s interest in the transaction is disclosed or
known to the board, and the other board members authorize the transaction with such
knowledge. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715(a) (McKinney 1997 & Supp.
2005). Without disclosure of the director’s interest, such a transaction may still be
considered valid so long as it was fair and reasonable to the nonprofit organization at the
time of the transaction. See id § 715(b). Practically speaking, the board of the Center
would have been well aware of Graham’s interest in any transaction involving her work,
and this knowledge would have validated such a transaction. So long as the board had
authorized such an arrangement, the “fair and reasonable” question would never have
been raised. Thus, a duty of loyalty question would have been relevant only if Graham
had personally utilized her works without the board’s knowledge and consent.
205
See id. § 508 (providing that all “profits shall be applied to the maintenance,
expansion or operation of the lawful activities of the corporation, and in no case shall be
divided or distributed in any manner whatsoever among the members, directors, or
officers of the corporation”); see also supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
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2. Private Inurement
On the federal level, to qualify for tax exemption under §
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, “no part of the net
earnings [may] inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual.”206 To allow “private inurement” would indicate that
the organization was operated for a private, rather than public,
purpose.207
The Treasury Department regulations define
prohibited private interests as those of “the creator or his family,
shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or
indirectly, by such private interests.”208 As the founder of the
Center, Graham would have qualified under this definition as a
“private shareholder or individual.”209
The Internal Revenue Service has denied or revoked tax
exemption from nonprofit organizations found to serve the private
interests of artists who were founders or directors of the
organizations, including “an organization whose primary purpose
[was] to promote the circulation of books [written by] one of its
incorporators;”210 “a cooperative art gallery formed and operated
by a group of artists for the purposes of exhibiting and selling their
work;”211 and a foundation, the resources of which were used for
the benefit of a board member who was a well-known textile artist
and wife of the foundation’s president.212 “The heart of §
501(c)(3) tax exempt status is the phrase ‘inures to the benefit.’ . . .
Unaccounted for diversions of a charitable organization’s

206

26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
See id.
208
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2004) (emphasis added).
209
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c) (“The words private shareholder or individual in
section 501 refer to persons having a personal and private interest in the activities of the
organization.”).
210
See Rev. Rul. 55-231, 1955-1 C.B. 72 (holding that an organization was not
organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes where its primary activity
was the purchase and distribution of an incorporator’s books).
211
See Rev. Rul. 71-395, 1971-2 C.B. 228 (holding that a gallery served only the private
purposes of its members, and therefore was not exempt under § 501(c)(3), where it was a
vehicle for advancing the careers of its members and promoting the sale of their work).
212
See Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-08-006 (Dec. 4, 1992) (holding that the foundation’s
earnings inured to the textile artist/board member where the foundation promoted the
board member’s art work and career).
207
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resources by one who has complete and unfettered control can
constitute inurement.”213
Intellectual property rights in choreography are a resource for a
dance company, although one for which the value is speculative
and contingent on access to other resources.214 As a party with a
prohibited private interest under the Treasury Regulations,215
Graham’s retention of copyright could have raised a question of
private inurement.
C. Artistic Control and Moral Rights
Another issue not arising in the Graham case but essential to
interpreting the significance of the ruling concerns “rights” of
artistic control, which may be viewed as analogous to moral
rights—personal rights of the author recognized as independent
from the economic rights of copyright.216 Although the U.S.
Copyright Act does not acknowledge such moral rights in either
works of choreography or works for hire, nor does the Act
recognize the existence of any moral rights after an artist’s
death,217 the relationship of moral rights to artistic control as
recognized within the dance field is noteworthy.

213

Church of Scientology v. Comm’r, 823 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming a
tax court decision which upheld the Commissioner’s revocation of tax exemption from
the Church of Scientology of California, the “Mother Church” of the many Scientology
churches, because significant sums of money had inured to the benefit of the church’s
founder, L. Ron Hubbard, and his family). But cf. Self-Realization Fellowship Church v.
Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 206 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that common
law copyrights to works of a Swami monk who was founder, president, and a director of
Self-Realization Fellowship Church did not vest in the church as a matter of law).
Following authorization of the IRS intermediate sanctions in 1996, a transaction
providing an “excess benefit” to a person in a position to exercise substantial influence
over the nonprofit organization may result in taxes on such person and on the nonprofit
director or officer allowing the transaction, rather than resulting in an immediate
revocation of tax exempt status. See 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2000).
214
See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
215
See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
216
See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01[A]
(2003) (citing WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE BERNE
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (Paris Act, 1971)
41 (1978); H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6928 (1990)).
217
See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
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1. Moral Rights Defined
Moral rights are rights of a “spiritual, non-economic, and
personal nature,”218 which are based on the theory that an original
creation reflects the personality of its creator.219 These rights
“result in a climate of artistic worth and honor that encourages the
author in the arduous act of creation.”220 In countries that
recognize such rights, even a full transfer of copyright for
economic purposes does not serve to divest an author of his moral
rights.221
European courts, however, have allowed these
“inalienable” rights to be waived or modified by contract.222
Moral rights are commonly believed to have originated in
France and developed in civil law jurisdictions.223 Specific moral
rights are defined by the national laws protecting their existence,
but such rights are generally of two types: rights of paternity (also
known as rights of attribution) and rights of integrity,224 which are
mandated by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, which states:
(1) Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
218

Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995).
See WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (Paris
Act, 1971) 41 (1978).
220
Carter, 71 F.3d at 83 (citation omitted).
221
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis,
Sept. 9, 1886, revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention],
available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo001en.htm. Under French law,
moral rights attach to the author rather than to the work itself, “and, therefore remain
vested in the artist even after the work is transferred.” 2 RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH
BRESLER, ART LAW 947 (2d ed. 1998) (citing Registrar of Copyrights Final Report,
Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks 39 (1996)).
222
See Singer, supra note 72, at 317 n.141 (citing William Strauss, The Moral Right of
the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506, 516–17 (1955)). The Berne Convention “disregards
the principle of assignability and does not prohibit waivability.” LERNER & BRESLER,
supra note 221, at 948 (citing Registrar of Copyrights Final Report, Waiver of Moral
Rights in Visual Artworks 52 (1996)).
223
See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 221, at 944. The term “moral rights” is literally
a translation of the French le droit moral. See Carter, 71 F.3d at 81.
224
See Carter, 71 F.3d at 81. Rights of paternity and integrity are protected by most of
the legal systems which currently acknowledge moral rights. See LERNER & BRESLER,
supra note 221, at 946.
219
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distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would
be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.225
Basic paternity rights under French law include the artist’s
rights to be publicly recognized as the creator of his work or to
publish anonymously or pseudonymously, to prevent another from
claiming authorship of his work, and to prevent his name from
being used in connection with the work of another or in connection
with an altered or distorted version of his own work.226 The
paternity right has been said to encompass an artist’s right “to have
his work attributed to him in the form in which he created it.”227
Enduring choreographic credit each time a dance is performed is
an example of a paternity right.228 Integrity rights allow an author
to prohibit or control alterations of his works.229
With
choreography, an integrity right is acknowledged in that those
performing the work are not allowed to make unauthorized
changes, but the choreographer retains the right to revise the work
“whenever aesthetic or practical reasons dictate.”230 In some
jurisdictions, the integrity right also allows an author to protect his
work from destruction.231
In addition, some European countries recognize a withdrawal
right which allows an artist to withdraw the work from the public
or to make modifications.232 This right may be exercised even if
exploitation rights have been transferred, “so long as the artist
indemnifies the transferee before exercising the right.”233
225

Berne Convention, supra note 221, art. 6bis; see also LERNER & BRESLER, supra note
221, at 947.
226
See Carter, 71 F.3d at 81; LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 221, at 946.
227
Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
228
See Singer, supra note 72, at 292–93.
229
See Carter, 71 F.3d at 81; LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 221, at 947.
230
Singer, supra note 72, at 310.
231
See Carter, 71 F.3d at 81–82. Protection against destruction is not expressly
mentioned in the Berne Convention, but such a right is recognized in the United States.
See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 221, at 947 (citing Edward J. Damich, The Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for
Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 963 (1990)).
232
See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 221, at 945.
233
Id. This right is rarely invoked. See id. at 946 (“[F]ew French cases have even
addressed the right.”).
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2. Limited U.S. Recognition of Moral Rights
American copyright law seeks primarily to vindicate the
economic rights of artists.234 The only moral rights currently
acknowledged by the 1976 Act are limited rights of attribution and
integrity, which are provided only to authors of works of visual
art.235 The Second Circuit has recognized, however, that “the
economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that serves
as the foundation for American copyright law cannot be reconciled
with the inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or
misrepresentation of their work to the public on which the artists
are financially dependent.”236
Even though Congress has yet to acknowledge full moral rights
for all genres of work, some federal and state courts have
recognized these rights as “necessary and proper adjuncts to the
creative process.”237 Courts have provided sporadic relief for
infringements of paternity and integrity rights by “cloaking the
concept in the guise of other legal theories,”238 such as invasion of
privacy,239 unfair competition,240 false designation of origin under
234

See Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976). According to the Supreme
Court, “the economic philosophy behind the clause” is “the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors . . . .” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
235
See Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2004). These
rights are limited to the life of the author, and they may not be transferred to another
party, although they may be waived via a signed writing. See id. § 106A(d)–(e). Works
of visual art include paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and photographs. See id. §
101. Works for hire are excluded from the definition of a “work of visual art.” See
generally id. Thus, neither works for hire nor works of choreography are eligible for any
moral rights protection under the 1976 Act.
236
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (internal citations omitted).
237
Singer, supra note 72, at 311.
238
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995). Per § 301(b)(3) of the
1976 Act, state court remedies that are not equivalent to those secured by the Act are not
preempted. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(b); Singer, supra note 72, at 311 n.111. “[F]ederal preemption is generally inapplicable to state laws of unfair competition of the passing off
variety, defamation, invasion of privacy, and contracts.” NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
216, § 8D.02(B). While the specific provisions of VARA preempt some state laws with
respect to moral rights in works of visual art, it is likely that state laws are not preempted
with respect to moral rights in other categories of work. Id.
239
See Singer, supra note 72, at 313 (citing Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 127 P.2d 577,
579–81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942) (finding that an improper attribution adversely affected an
artist’s good reputation and, therefore, constituted an invasion of privacy)).
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the Lanham Act,241 breach of contract,242 and defamation.243 These
decisions “vindicate the author’s personal right to prevent the
presentation of his work to the public in a distorted form,” even
though the holdings have been based on proprietary rights in one’s
creation rather than an acknowledgement of the legal existence of
moral rights.244 “Where, however, the parties have entered into a
contract . . . [any] so-called ‘moral right’ is controlled by the law
of contract.”245
To the extent that an employment relationship exists and
copyright ownership vests in the employer rather than the artist,

240

See id. (citing Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952)). The Granz case held
that “although the purchaser of the plaintiff’s master record discs could lawfully use,
produce, and sell abbreviated versions of the records, to publicly attribute them to the
plaintiff without express contractual authorization would constitute unfair competition.”
Id.
241
See id. at 315 n.133 (citing Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 23–24 (2d Cir. 1976)
(holding that disputed mutilations to Monty Python’s work might deter viewers from
becoming Monty Python fans and thus constituted false representation under the Lanham
Act; additionally, “the Lanham Act was violated by a representation that, while
technically correct, creates a false impression of a product’s origin”)); Geisel v. Poynter
Prod., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that use of the pseudonym
“Dr. Seuss” on the advertising and sale of dolls, without authorization, constituted false
designations of origin under the Lanham Act).
242
See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24–26 (citing Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952)
(holding that, as a matter of contract, an obligation to mention the name of the author
carries with it the implied duty not to make such changes in the work as would render the
credit line a false attribution of authorship)).
243
See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 221, at 957 (citing Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis
& Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187, 189, 192 (1960) (holding that a publisher had impaired the
reputation of an author by publishing an error-ridden edition of his book without
indicating that the author had not performed the revision, as “the purchase of the
copyright did not carry with it a license to defame”)).
244
See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (citing Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891,
895–96 (2d Cir. 1937)). “[T]he Lanham Act does not deal with artistic integrity. It only
goes to misdescription of origin and the like.” Id. at 27 (Gurfein, J., concurring).
245
Edison v. Viva Int’l, Ltd., 421 N.Y.S.2d 203, 206 (App. Div. 1979) (holding that
plaintiff’s moral right to protection had been subsumed in his contractual right to seek
redress for the alleged mutilation of his article); see also Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 27
(Gurfein, J., concurring) (noting that if the “licensee may, by contract, distort the
recorded work, the Lanham Act does not come into play”); McGuire v. United Artists
Television Prods., Inc., 254 F. Supp. 270, 271–72 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (holding that where
there was a contract, the artist’s right of artistic control was lost absent express
reservation by the artist within the contract, regardless of the custom of the film industry).
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the right to attribution is relinquished unless expressly reserved.246
In a work-for-hire situation, listing authorship credit under the
corporate name “accurately reflects the legal state of affairs.”247
“[A]ll U.S. creators working in an employment relationship will,
on account of that employment status, be most challenged to
vindicate, under copyright law, any of the quasi-moral rights”
recognized by U.S. courts.248
III. REALITIES: THE CONTROL CONUNDRUM
The Graham ruling is significant to both artists and legal
practitioners because it establishes that artists employed by
nonprofit organizations, even those organizations that they
themselves have created, are not exempt from the work-for-hire
doctrine.249 While Graham is also one of the few cases to deal
with a dance copyright issue, it arguably sets a precedent not only
for choreographers, but also for artists creating in other genres
while employed by nonprofit organizations. This precedent,
however, is not as “dangerous” as it may seem to many artists.
Artists do not necessarily give up all rights to their creations by
forming nonprofit organizations to finance and facilitate their
works, even following the Second Circuit’s ruling that an artist
creating under the aegis of a nonprofit organization had ceded
authorship status to the nonprofit employer.250
246

Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1260 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Vargas v. Esquire,
Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 524–27 (7th Cir.1947) (holding that an artist could not claim a right
of attribution against a magazine where the artist was found to have granted the magazine
all rights to his drawings in exchange for monthly compensation)); Nelson v. Radio
Corp., 148 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D. Fla. 1957) (denying a singer a right to attribution in the
absence of an agreement to provide label credit, where the singer was found to be an
employee of the recording company).
247
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 216, § 8D.03(A)(3) (citing Dun & Bradstreet Corp.
v. Harpercollins Publ’rs, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)); see also Graham IV,
380 F.3d 624, 638 n.30 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S.
Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-1277) (holding that a copyright notice in the Center’s name was
sufficient to preserve Graham’s copyright even though the work was not determined to be
a work for hire) (citing Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 402–03
(2d Cir. 1970)).
248
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 216, § 8D.02(D)(1).
249
See generally supra Part II.A.
250
See generally supra Part II.A.
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A. Nonprofit Organizations Promote Artists’ Economic and
Artistic Interests
Graham made a conscious choice in the nonprofit structure of
the Center because of the many benefits it provided.251 In 1957,
Graham wrote:
The [Center] has made a legal arrangement with me by
means of which they ‘buy’ the school and my name. . . . I
am in a position to solicit funds from large foundations
because [the Center] is tax exempt. Also the [Center] takes
over matters of management. . . . There is not much more
money availabel [sic] but there is so much less worry and
fear because it is well taken care of and the future is better
arranged for than ever before.252
She chose to establish and rely on a nonprofit organization so
that she would not have to deal with financial and legal matters,
freeing her to focus on creative endeavors,253 and she recognized
that, “[f]or the future there must always be the security of a place
to work for people like us.”254
“[T]he policy reason for granting copyright protection to
choreographic works is to encourage production of choreographic
works that will inure to the public benefit.”255 The purposes of
251

See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 640 (“Graham went to great lengths to become an
employee of the Center so that she could insulate herself from the legal and financial
aspects of her work.”).
252
Brief for Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees at 2, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624
(2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)) (citations omitted) (quoting a letter from Graham to her
mother). In the letter, Graham also explained, “I shall have a salary over the years
regardless of the intake of the school.” Dunning, Dance and Profit, supra note 4.
253
See Graham IV, 380 F.3d at 629 (finding that Graham began relying on nonprofit
corporations, which she led, to support her work “for tax reasons and because she wanted
to extricate herself from funding and legal matters”); Brief for Defendants-CounterClaimants-Appellees at 2, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L))
(noting that Graham was “clear-sighted enough to take steps” to ensure her legacy and
free her time for creative endeavors, “leaving the financial and practical worries to
others”).
254
Brief for Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees at 3, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624
(2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)) (quoting Joint Appendix A2977).
255
Thomas J. Overton, Comment, Unraveling the Choreographer’s Copyright
Dilemma, 49 TENN. L. REV. 594, 597 (1982). “The copyright laws are clearly intended to
provide economic incentives to produce artistic works, and the legislative objective
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copyright protection can be well served by allowing copyright to
vest in a nonprofit organization, especially an artist-driven
organization established for the purpose of supporting the
development of work by a particular artist and maintaining,
protecting, and preserving that work.256 The physical author’s
interests may be furthered by this arrangement as well, especially
when the artist and the nonprofit organization have a shared
interest and a symbiotic relationship. Thus, the motivating factors
in the choice of the nonprofit structure are often the same as the
reasons why the nonprofit may be better equipped to protect and
secure the work.
Nonprofits must reinvest any profits into their programs.257 In
the case of an artist-centered organization, the nonprofit’s
programs are integrally tied to the founding artist’s work.258 This
reinvestment generally translates into the financing of further
creative works by the founding artist;259 thus, the artist reaps the
benefit of the economic right, and the copyright serves its purpose
as an impetus for creativity. In the case of the Center, income
from the performance and the licensing of Graham’s dances helped
to finance rehearsal space, dancer salaries, and other resources
utilized by Graham for the creation of subsequent works.260 The
nonprofit structure also provides the artist with other financial
resources—such as the ability to solicit contributions and generate
tax-free revenue—which provide additional support for the
creation of new work.261
Nonprofit organizations have perpetual life.262 They are
empowered to outlive their founders and thus can give creative

behind the copyright laws is to bring as many new works into the public domain as
possible.” Id. at 611 (citation omitted).
256
See, e.g., supra note 24 and accompanying text.
257
See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 204 (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2005);
BJORKLUND ET AL., supra note 62, § 1-2; supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
258
See supra notes 24, 64–65 and accompanying text.
259
See supra notes 24, 62–65 and accompanying text.
260
See supra notes 150–51, 161, 186–87 and accompanying text.
261
See supra notes 54–61 and accompanying text.
262
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 202(a)(1).
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work a life beyond the natural life of a founding artist.263
Although there is some debate as to whether all artists want their
works to live on after their deaths,264 and though it has been
posited that Graham “may have subconsciously wished to take her
work with her to the grave,”265 Graham expressed a clear desire for
the Center to continue after her death. “So deeply concerned am I
for the future of my work and that the Martha Graham Center goes
on,” Graham wrote, “that I have ensured through my attorney that
the technique and the ballets will continue to be available and used
by the Martha Graham Company and School.”266 In her will,
Graham also named the Center as the sole contingent
beneficiary267 and “requested that, in lieu of a funeral or memorial
service, ‘contributions be made to the Martha Graham Center of
Contemporary Dance, Inc. to support that which has played such a
rich and meaningful part in my life.’”268
263

One of the reasons for the establishment of the Center was to “perpetuat[e] and
preserv[e] Graham’s work after her death.” Brief for Defendants-Counter-ClaimantsAppellees at 10, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)); see also
Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 43 Fed. Appx. 408 (2d Cir.
2002).
264
See Singer, supra note 72, at 301 n.61.
The late George Balanchine viewed his ballets as “butterflies” destined to live
for a season. In answer to a question concerning the preservation of his ballets,
Balanchine once remarked, “They don’t have to be preserved. Why should
they be? I think ballet is NOW. It’s about people who are NOW. Not about
what will be. Because as soon as you don’t have these bodies to work with, it’s
already finished.”
Id. (quoting George Balanchine, Work In Progress, in DANCE AS A THEATRE ART:
SOURCE READINGS IN DANCE HISTORY FROM 1581 TO THE PRESENT 187, 192 (Selma Jean
Cohen ed., 1975)). And yet, more than two decades after his death, Balanchine’s works
continue to be performed by major ballet companies around the world. See George
Balanchine, at http://www.balanchine.org/01/index.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
Eighty-seven works are currently in active repertory. See Ballets in Active Repertory, at
http://www.balanchine.org/01/activerep.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2004).
265
Carman, supra note 82. “Choreographers . . . rarely wish to deal with the
consequences of their deaths.” Jowitt, supra note 44.
266
Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 521 (quoting a September 14, 1990 letter written by
Ron Protas on behalf of Martha Graham to Jim McGarry “concerning a potentially
negative article that was to be written by Laura Shapiro of Newsweek”).
267
Brief for Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees at 11, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624
(2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)); see also supra note 39.
268
Brief for Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees at 12, Graham IV, 380 F.3d 624
(2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)). In a letter to Jerome Robbins shortly before her death
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Not only are artists’ interests upheld by this arrangement, but
the artist may still retain ultimate artistic control, even if divested
of personal economic ownership. Representatives of the dance
community have argued that “depriving [the] artist of all rights in
the work, including the rights to create derivative works, to
perform, publicly display, license and otherwise control the work
does great damage to the organization’s mission, and to the author
personally.”269 If the artist controls the board of directors,
however—either through actual, acknowledged control or through
a more subtle sense of deference to the artist’s wishes—the artist
would likely remain in control of the work even if the nonprofit
organization were to hold the copyright. It was established that
Graham controlled the activities of the Center;270 thus, it stands to
reason that she retained ultimate control over its property, which,
according to the court, included her dances.271 Even pure
employee status would allow the artist to act as an agent of the
organization and make decisions regarding the use of her works; in
hiring her as Artistic Director, the board would have vested in
Graham the authority to make artistic decisions.272
B. Artists’ Rights as Distinct from Successors’ Rights
It is worth noting that the Graham case was not a dispute
between a nonprofit organization and the artist that had created the
works in question, but rather a dispute with that artist’s legatee.273
In a copyright dispute similar to that between Protas and the
Center, but between a living artist and a nonprofit organization,
many other issues would likely come into play. If board members
were denying a founding artist any control over her works, this
in 1991, Graham also wrote that “the company must continue now and in the future.”
Carman, supra note 82.
269
Brief of Amici Curiae American Dance Festival, Inc. et al. at 11, Graham IV, 380
F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-9451(L)).
270
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
271
See Graham III, 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, 380 F.3d
624 (2d Cir. 2004).
272
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 43 (2004) (“Acquiescence by the
principal in conduct of an agent whose previously conferred authorization reasonably
might include it, indicates that the conduct was authorized; if clearly not included in the
authorization, acquiescence in it indicates affirmance.”).
273
See discussion supra Part I.B.
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action might cause concern among funding organizations or could
potentially be construed as a breach of the board’s duty to uphold
the mission of the organization, because a board could not claim to
be furthering the development of an artist’s work while divesting
the artist of any control over that same work. Although the workfor-hire doctrine may require that the nonprofit be acknowledged
as the “statutory author” for copyright purposes,274 a living artist
would likely have other avenues for redress. Where underlying
equitable considerations—such as who deserved to own the
works—weighed against Protas in his dispute with the Center,
these same considerations would likely weigh in favor of a living
artist in a dispute with a nonprofit organization over either control
or ownership of the artist’s works.
The Second Circuit’s use of the work-for-hire doctrine could
potentially be interpreted as nothing more than a constraint on the
artist’s right to transfer copyright ownership at the time of her
death. Admittedly a limitation on ownership, this restriction might
be viewed as a fair exchange for the benefits provided by the
nonprofit organization. “Ms. Graham obtained crucial public
support for her creative enterprise by forming corporations that
could take advantage of tax exempt, tax-deductible treatment. . . .
It is important that the public also receive the benefit of this
bargain, so that her great achievements can be perpetuated by the
charities she founded.”275
C. Artistic Control and the “Moral” Aspects of Economic Rights
Apart from the control an artist may wield via her leadership
role within a nonprofit organization, artists retain intrinsic moral

274

See discussion supra Part II.A.
Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer
Says Court Ruling Will Preserve Martha Graham Dance Legacy (July 5, 2002) (quoting
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer as he hailed the Second Circuit’s earlier decision in the
Graham case, Graham II, 43 Fed. Appx. 408, 410 (2d Cir. 2002), as “a unanimous
federal appeals court ruling upholding the rights of two charities, the Martha Graham
School of Contemporary Dance and the Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance,
to continue to operate according to the wishes of the legendary dancer”), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/jul/jul05a_02.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
275
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rights as well.276 To artists, there is definite value in rights of
artistic control.277 Artistic control as recognized among artists is
essentially the enforcement of the moral facets of the economic
rights of copyright. Although traditional moral rights, as such, are
not widely recognized in the United States,278 the essence of these
moral rights can be found within U.S. economic rights. Each of
the economic rights of copyright may be said to have a moral
component, and if the strictly economic element of each right
could be detached, a moral right would remain.
It is inherent that the economic rights secured by copyright
may also be asserted in the negative, thus guaranteeing that an
author has the right to not reproduce, not prepare derivative works,
not distribute copies, not perform, and not display.279 These
negative rights may be equated with artistic control over the work.
Additionally, traditional moral rights infuse the basic economic
rights. All of the rights secured by copyright carry with them the
right of attribution, such that the party in control of these rights
may require that appropriate credit be given in any licensed use of
a right.280 The right to prepare derivative works also encompasses
the right to control the creation of derivative works by other
parties, which equates with a right of integrity.281 The right to not
perform or display is in essence the right to withhold or withdraw
the work from the public, like the European withdrawal right.282
Due to the founding artist’s influence within a nonprofit
organization, the deference accorded the artist’s wishes, and the

276

“A statement from the Max Planck Institute avers that ‘each moral right has what is
called a “positive nucleus,” which is regarded as being so vital to the expression of the
respective personality that any waiver would be null and void.’” NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 216, § 8D.01(A) n.30 (quoting Register of Copyrights, Technological
Alterations to Motion Pictures 78 n.134 (1989)).
277
See Singer, supra note 72, at 307. “It all comes down to this: if you put your name
on something, you should be there.” GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 14.
278
See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
279
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
280
See supra notes 226–28 and accompanying text.
281
See supra notes 229–31 and accompanying text.
282
See supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text.
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artist’s unique ability to utilize these rights, the artist herself
remains in control of the moral elements of economic rights.283
The custom of the American dance community provides
choreographers with an effective mechanism for the
acknowledgement and enforcement of their moral rights.284 The
right of paternity is upheld through enduring choreographic
credit.285 “The choreographer’s name attaches to his work at the
first and all subsequent performances of the work, whether or not
the choreographer, his company, or another company has legal
ownership of the piece.”286 Dance community custom recognizes
the artist’s rights to preserve the integrity of his work, even after he
has relinquished control of the economic rights to that work, as
evidenced in choreographers’ ability to withdraw a licensed work
due to artistic concerns.287
“[T]he primary interest of choreographers in maintaining the
artistic integrity of their works conflicts with the Copyright Act’s
favoring of economic benefits at the expense of artistic
283

Such control would necessarily be limited to the extent it might infringe on the
“public benefit” provided by the nonprofit organization. See supra notes 57, 255 and
accompanying text. Where a choreographer’s decision to withdraw a single work from a
dance company’s repertoire would likely be deferred to as an aesthetic choice, a
choreographer’s attempt to withdraw her entire body of work from public presentation
might be interpreted as threatening the existence of the nonprofit organization. Cf. supra
Part II.B.
284
See Singer, supra note 72, at 318.
285
See id. at 292.
286
Id. at 292–93. Marius Petipa’s name, for example, is still linked to the classic ballet
Sleeping Beauty, which was first performed in 1890, even though the choreography has
undergone many changes since its first performance and the work has long since been in
the public domain. See id. at 293 n.22.
287
See id. at 310, 318. George Balanchine was known to withdraw works from licensee
companies’ repertories when the artistic director to whom he had licensed the works left
the dance company. See id. at 310 n.107 (citations omitted).
When the Pennsylvania Ballet forced its artistic director, Barbara Weisberger,
to resign in February 1982, Balanchine promptly notified the company that he
intended to withdraw his ballets from the company’s repertoire. Balanchine
explained that he had originally given the works to Weisberger (a Balanchine
protégé), and since she was no longer in charge of “her” company, he did not
wish to have his ballets performed by them. . . . Balanchine also withdrew
works from the Pacific Northwest Ballet when former NYCB principal Melissa
Hayden left that company.
Id.
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concerns.”288 Since copyright law does not acknowledge these
rights of control that are of the utmost importance to artists, the
repercussions of a determination of copyright ownership are
limited and, as a matter of practice or custom, control of such
rights does not necessarily vest in the “statutory author.”
D. Contracting for Control
A nonprofit organization is not required to assert its work-forhire rights against a founding artist; yet, in light of the issues
unearthed by the Graham case, artists creating work while
employed by nonprofit organizations would be well advised to
validate their ownership assumptions in writing. “[T]he initial
ownership of rights in a work made for hire are only presumed to
be in the employer . . . , which presumption may be rebutted by an
express agreement in writing between the parties.”289 Since
founding artists generally exert control over nonprofit dance
companies and other artist-driven organizations, these artists are in
a strong bargaining position and should be able to contract for an
arrangement that reflects their wishes. In response to the concerns
raised by the Graham ruling, Dance/NYC, a service organization
for the dance community, has drafted several model intellectual
property agreements290 which may suffice for most dance artists’
needs. With an eye toward fairness in light of potential private
inurement issues, and being mindful not to reap a personal profit at
the expense of the nonprofit organization, the artist should be able
to own and/or control the rights to her work within the confines of
both copyright and nonprofit law.

288

Singer, supra note 72, at 304.
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 216, § 5.03(D); see also supra notes 146, 169 and
accompanying text. “If such a presumption were not rebuttable, a serious issue of
constitutional validity would be raised.” NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 216, § 5.03(D).
As the Constitution ‘‘authorizes only the enactment of legislation securing ‘authors’ the
exclusive right of their writings, [i]t would thus be quite doubtful that Congress could
grant employers the exclusive right to the writings of employees regardless of the
circumstances.” Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1969).
290
See Contract Templates, at http://www.dancenyc.org/dancers.asp?file=contract (last
visited Feb. 4, 2005). See in particular the “Letter of Agreement covering work created
in the past or to be created in the future by the artistic director/choreographer of a single
choreographer company.” Id.
289
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In contracting for the rights to their work, choreographers
should give careful consideration to their ultimate goals. Although
an artist may choose to contract for full ownership of all economic
and moral rights, she should keep in mind the potential artistic
repercussions if her heir or legatee should be uncooperative or if
she should die intestate and without an heir.291 It is conceivable
that choreographic rights would be better protected in the hands of
a nonprofit organization with a board dedicated to nurturing and
preserving the artist’s work, than in the hands of the artist’s chosen
beneficiary, statutory heir, or a disinterested party chosen to
dispose of intestate assets.292 As an alternative to retaining full
copyright ownership, an artist might choose to allow the copyright
to vest in the nonprofit organization, while contracting for a
consultation right or, better yet, some level of control over
exploitation of one or more of the exclusive rights of the copyright
holder. This would in essence be a contract for the artist to retain
moral rights. Retention of these rights should not raise a private
inurement issue, since these rights do not hold a legally
acknowledged economic value.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s ruling is not cause for alarm among
artists. Where an artist is the primary creative force behind a
nonprofit organization, the artist will generally retain artistic
control regardless of who holds the copyright, the economic rights
of the nonprofit organization will ultimately benefit the artist, and
291

Choreographer Erick Hawkins, for example, died without leaving a will. See Jennifer
Dunning, Forum Asks, Who Owns A Dance?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002, at E1. Upon his
death in 1994, his wife and collaborator, Lucia Dlugoszewski, inherited his work and
took over the supervision of the Erick Hawkins Dance Company. Id. When
Dlugoszewski died in 2000, also without a will, the company seemed to die with her, and
the disposition of Hawkins’ dances was left up to the public administrator. Id.
292
Choreographer Paul Taylor has decided that his works will go to his company, the
Paul Taylor Dance Company, after his death. See Jennifer Dunning, Graham Company
Leaps Back to Life; But After a Favorable Court Ruling, Questions Linger About
Choreographers’ Legacies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at E1. “‘The thing about
[Graham’s] works going to the company seems right to me, . . . [n]ot just because she
was an employee of the company and the company therefore owns the dances. That
seems logical. But I’m real glad the dances will be seen.’” Id. (quoting Paul Taylor).
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informal recognition of “moral rights” within the field likely will
not change as a result of Graham.293 The Graham case should,
however, alert artists to the importance of carefully considering
their intentions for the future of their work as well as the need to
memorialize these intentions in writing.
In the end, most choreographers will never be faced with such
a controversy over the rights to their legacy. According to
choreographer Eliot Feld, “I wish people were stealing my work
left and right, and it became an enormous issue for me. . . . The
idea that any of us would share the problem that Martha’s work has
engendered is presumptuous beyond belief.”294 No one can predict
the future, however, and the financial climate for dance is
constantly evolving.295 It is important for choreographers to
consider the future and make arrangements for the rights to their
works as if that work might someday be the subject of such a
dispute. As an emerging choreographer in the early twentieth
century, even Martha Graham could not have predicted the chaos
that would ensue after her death.

293
But see generally Sarah Kutner & Holly Rich, Note, Dirty Dancing: Attributing the
Moral Right of Attribution to American Copyright Law: The Work-for-Hire Doctrine and
the Usurping of the Ultimate Grand Dame and Founder of Modern Dance, Martha
Graham, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 325 (analyzing similar issues but reaching a
contrary conclusion).
294
Carman, supra note 82. “Martha was and is a transformer of dance of the first
order.” Id. (quoting Eliot Feld).
295
See generally Dunning, Dance and Profit, supra note 4.
This is definitely a success problem. . . . These problems would never have
existed 50 years ago, because the concept of a penny being made by a
choreographer or from a dance was unheard of. So now that the commercial
aspect of making money has prevailed in this nonprofit world of dance, and the
valuable asset is the dance itself—hey, that’s a success story.
Id. (quoting Charles Reinhart, director of the American Dance Festival).

